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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
On 10 June 2015, at Sharma El Sheikh in the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Africa continent 
witnessed the achievement of another milestone in its economic integration drive, when leaders 
representing 26 countries from eastern and southern Africa signed an agreement aimed at 
establishing the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA).  The TFTA initiative has been hailed as a 
landmark, likened to important African events, such as, the independence of Ghana in 1957 and 
the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and its re-invention as the 
African Union (AU) in 2002.
1
  The TFTA initiative aims at establishing a free trade area (FTA) 
among countries that are members of three existing regional economic communities (RECs) on 
the continent.  These existing RECs are: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC).  
 
It is expected that once the TFTA is fully operational, it may comprise a large market of close to 
632 million customers, representing 48 per cent of the entire African population and 8 per cent of 
the world’s population.2 Furthermore, the TFTA may cover an estimated area of around 17.3 
million square kilometres which is similar to the size of Russia and more than four times the size 
                                            
1
 Juma C & Mangeni F ‘The benefits of Africa’s new Free Trade Area’ 11 June 2015 (Online article) available at: 
http://www.technologyandpolicy.org/2015/06/11/the-benefits-of-africas-new-freetradearea/#.Vk5QHHYrKM9 
(accessed 30 November 2015). 
 
2
 Juma C & Mangeni F (2015).    
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of the European Union.
3
  The TFTA may also boast of a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 
1.3 trillion, representing 51 per cent of the continent’s total GDP.4  
 
The TFTA is aimed at promoting the rapid social and economic development of the region it 
covers through: trade liberalisation; establishment of a large single market with free movement 
of goods and services; promoting intra-regional trade; enhancing regional and continental 
integration processes; ensuring regional harmonisation of trade rules and procedures; and 
building a strong FTA for the benefit of the people in its region.
5
  
 
In addition, the TFTA initiative is also being seen as a launch pad in the pursuit of the broader 
objective of the AU, in its vision under the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the 1994 African 
Economic Community Treaty (Abuja Treaty) of creating a single continental market.
6
  The 
Abuja Treaty proposes the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC), a 
continent-wide market of goods and services, by the year 2028.
7
 The TFTA may therefore serve 
as an important building block in order to achieve this AU objective. A functioning TFTA may 
not only help in developing resilience in firms on the African continent so that they are able to 
compete well in the global market, but may also help in attracting the much needed foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and wealth creation.
8
  
 
Lastly, the TFTA is also aimed at addressing some problems associated with multiple REC 
memberships, by harmonising the various trade rules and procedures in the three RECs. In this 
                                            
3
 Andriamananjara S ‘Understanding the importance of the Tripartite Free Trade Area’ 17 June 2015  (online article) 
available at: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2015/06/17-tripartite-free-trade-area-
andriamananjara (accessed 30 November 2015). 
 
4
 Mabuza Z & Luke D ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement: a milestone for Africa’ (online article) available 
at: http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/the-tripartite-free-trade-area-agreement-a-milestone-for-
africa%E2%80%99s (accessed 30 November 2015). 
 
5
 Art. 4 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
6
 Shinyekwa I & Othieno L ‘Prospects and challenges in the formation of the COMESA-EAC and SADC 
 Tripartite Free Trade Area’ Economic Policy Research Centre (ESRP)  Research Series No.87. (Nov 2011) 
 1  available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/150241/2/series87.pdf (accessed 27 April 2016). 
 
7
 Shinyekwa I & Othieno L (2011) 1. 
 
8
 Juma C & Mangeni F (2015) 1. 
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study, it will be observed that some countries in the three RECs have overlapping and multiple 
memberships.  This condition has often created trade bottlenecks and uncertainties when 
countries are trading with each other, hence hindered trade growth.
9
  The TFTA initiative is 
therefore aimed at resolving these challenges. 
 
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Overlapping and multiple memberships of the RECs have been blamed as a factor inhibiting 
progress in intra-African trade.
10
  The three RECs in the TFTA contain countries that are 
members of more than one REC.  The current membership in the three RECs is as follows. 
 
First, COMESA was established by a treaty that came into force in 1994, consists of countries in 
the eastern and southern Africa.
11
  Currently, COMESA consists of the following member states: 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland,
12
 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Of the 19 COMESA member states, four
13
 are EAC partner 
states while eight
14
 other members are SADC member states.  
 
Secondly, the EAC is the smallest but the most advanced region in terms of integration among 
the three RECs in the TFTA.
15
  The EAC was formed in the year 2000 and, with the recent 
                                            
9
 Shinyekwa I & Othieno L (2011) 1. 
 
10
 Kalenga P ‘Making the Tripartite FTA work’ in Hartzenberg T (Ed) From Cape to Cairo: Making the Tripartite 
Free Trade Area work (2011) 5  available at: http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/4660/cape-to-cairo-2-ch-1-
kalenga.pdf (accessed 28 April 2016). 
 
11
 Kalenga P (2011) 5. 
 
12
 Swaziland is also a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and therefore is unable to 
implement the COMESA customs union. 
 
13
 These countries are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. 
 
14
 These countries are DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
However, DRC is not part of the SADC FTA. 
 
15
 Kalenga P (2011) 5. 
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accession to the EAC Treaty by South Sudan,
16
 now consists of the following six countries: 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.  As noted above, four
17
 of the 
EAC partner states are member states of COMESA, whereas one country, Tanzania, is a SADC 
member state. 
 
Lastly, SADC was established by a treaty in 1994 and currently consists of the following 15 
countries: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
18
  Similarly, as 
noted above, eight
19
 of SADC member states are member states of COMESA where as one 
country, Tanzania, is an EAC partner state. 
 
The consolidation of these three RECs into one large TFTA is therefore being seen as a way of 
resolving existing regional integration challenges caused by multiple REC memberships through 
the harmonising of the different REC trade rules and procedures.
20
  Much as the establishment of 
the TFTA is being viewed as a panacea for most of the challenges caused by multiple REC 
memberships, there are certain areas where the TFTA Agreement may not be able to deliver that 
which has been eagerly expected of it.  For instance, the TFTA Agreement will, in addition to the 
existing REC institutions, establish new institutions to oversee the implementation and 
functioning of the TFTA. The sustenance of these TFTA institutions may be burdensome, 
especially for countries with multiple REC memberships.   
 
This mini thesis therefore intends to investigate how the establishment of institutions under the 
TFTA Agreement, may negatively impact on countries with multiple REC memberships.  
 
 
                                            
16
 History of EAC  available at: http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-history (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
17
 See Footnote 13. 
 
18
 Kalenga P (2011) 5.   
However, Angola, DRC and Seychelles are not part of the SADC FTA. 
 
19
 See Footnote 14. 
 
20
 Kalenga P (2011) 5. 
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1.3. Significance of the Study 
This study is significant and relevant. With the recent signing of the TFTA Agreement, countries 
that are members of the three RECs are currently contemplating whether to ratify the TFTA 
Agreement.  The study therefore investigates the probable challenges that may be encountered by 
TFTA countries, especially those that will maintain multiple REC memberships.  
 
The study also, to some extent, offers rare insights into the kind of considerations countries are 
having before the ratification of not only the TFTA Agreement, but also other legal instruments 
that require ratification and implementation within their respective RECs. 
 
In addition, the study makes recommendations on areas where the TFTA Agreement may have 
overlooked whilst trying to address the problem of multiple REC memberships.  
 
1.4. Limitations of the Study 
This study is restricted to a discussion of the negative repercussions or consequences that may 
likely be encountered by countries with multiple REC memberships as a result of the 
establishment of TFTA institutions. The study could have included other disadvantages that may 
be encountered by all countries involved in the TFTA, but due to the limitation of space that was 
not possible. 
 
Furthermore, since the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is not a party to the TFTA, the 
discussion will be restricted to SACU countries in their capacity as SADC or COMESA member 
states only.  
 
1.5. Objectives of the Study 
The benefits of membership to the TFTA or the RECs have been explained by many a scholar.  
There is a dearth of literature on how the TFTA arrangement may help solve the problems 
caused by multiple and overlapping REC memberships.  However, there is little literature on the 
flipside to this subject.  The negative side of the TFTA membership has not been a subject of 
much academic scrutiny, let alone the consequences of multiple REC memberships in the TFTA. 
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This study therefore investigates the repercussions or negative consequences that countries with 
multiple REC memberships in the TFTA will encounter as a result of the establishment of TFTA 
institutions. The study therefore, discusses these repercussions and then makes recommendations 
on how they can be addressed or ameliorated. 
 
1.6. Research Questions 
In the above discussion, it was indicated that the TFTA Agreement will establish new institutions 
that will be responsible for the implementation of the TFTA. Art. 29 of the TFTA Agreement 
will establish several institutions that will be responsible for overseeing the functioning and 
implementation of the TFTA. For instance, it will establish the Tripartite Summit, the Tripartite 
Council of Ministers of Trade, and the Tripartite Committee of Senior officials, among others. 
For Tripartite member states, the TFTA institutions will bring in extra obligations, in addition to 
those they already have in their respective RECs. For countries with multiple REC memberships, 
TFTA institutions will mean fresh obligations, in addition to the multiple treaty obligations they 
already have by virtue of their multiple REC memberships.    
 
Furthermore, there appears to be little clarity on how the institutions to be established under the 
TFTA Agreement will interact with the existing REC institutions. Art. 30 (7) of the TFTA 
Agreement only provides that the TFTA Agreement shall prevail in cases where there is a 
conflict or inconsistency between it and any REC treaty or instrument. There is no clear 
hierarchy between the TFTA and the existing RECs in terms of choice of law and choice of 
jurisdiction. The effect of such unclear scenario will mean parties, especially in countries with 
multiple REC memberships, will be left at a cross-road as to which instrument or law will be 
applicable when engaging in trading activities. This uncertain economic environment is 
unattractive to investors. 
 
From the above discussion, there are several questions that come to the fore, especially with 
regard to countries with multiple REC memberships. These questions are as follows: 
 
(a) Whether the establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement will have any 
repercussions on countries that have multiple REC memberships?  
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(b) Whether the lack of clarity on the hierarchy of the institutions established under the 
TFTA Agreement and those existing institutions in the three RECs will not further 
exacerbate the challenges for countries multiple REC memberships? 
(c) What are the possible conclusions that can be drawn and recommendations that can be 
made? 
 
 
1.7. Proposed Methodology 
This study is a desktop activity which draws on both primary and secondary sources available 
both electronically and in print.  The former includes legal sources, such as the TFTA 
Agreement, treaties establishing the three RECs and REC communiqués.  The latter comprises 
mainly books, chapters in books, journal articles, online publications, and REC communications 
and press statements. The study therefore relies on existing information on the subject in order to 
answer the research questions. 
 
 
1.8. Chapter Outline 
The mini-thesis comprises the following chapters: 
 
Chapter Two 
This chapter provides a historical background and the current membership status of the three 
RECs. It also discusses the COMESA Treaty, the EAC Treaty and the SADC Treaty, and gives 
an overview of the nature and functions of the institutions that have been established thereunder.  
 
Chapter Three 
This chapter gives a historical background to the formation of the TFTA.  It also provides an 
overview of the TFTA Agreement and the nature and functions of the institutions which the 
Agreement intends to establish. This chapter also discusses the relationship expected to exist 
between the institutions to be established under the TFTA Agreement and those institutions 
established under the COMESA, EAC and SADC treaties.   
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Chapter Four 
This chapter mainly discusses the repercussions for countries with multiple REC memberships 
caused as a result of the establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement. In answering 
the above question, the study will also examine the question whether the lack of clarity on the 
hierarchy of the institutions established under the TFTA initiative and the institutions in 
existence under the three RECs will have any effect on countries that have multiple REC 
memberships. 
 
Chapter Five 
This chapter contains a summary of conclusions drawn from the whole study and makes the 
necessary recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA (COMESA), 
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) AND THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 
One of the legacies of colonialism in Africa is the creation of small and fragmented states that 
have remained economically unconnected.
21
 Most newly independent African states maintained 
their economic umbilical cords by significantly trading with their former colonial masters in 
Europe, as opposed to their neighbouring states. Hence, over the years there has been 
insignificant intra-Africa trade.
22
 Lack of efficiency in the production of goods, the export of 
primarily raw materials to Europe, high costs of production, low foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and other poor macro-economic factors did very little to ameliorate the livelihood and welfare of 
the African people.
23
  
 
Over the period, as a way of addressing these economic challenges, some economists have held 
the view that the solutions to the problems lay in the political and economic unification of the 
                                            
21
 It has been argued that the geopolitical configuration of Africa was not determined by the emergence of nation 
states but the political forces of colonisation. 
 See. World Trade Organisation (WTO) WTO Report 2011- The WTO and Preferential trade agreements: From co-
existence to coherence (2011) 151. 
 
22
 Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)  Assessing Regional Integration in Africa ECA Policy Report (2004) 
2.   
In addition, the smallness and fragmentation of the economies was also associated with uneven distribution of 
natural resources and lack of economies of scale in both the production and distribution of goods and services. 
 
23
 In the year 2007, a study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) found that the 
small sub-Saharan African economy with a population of around 819 million people was fragmented into 47 
countries of which, 34 fell into a group defined as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The average income levels 
also low hence poverty was rampant.  
(See. UNCTAD  Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for 
Africa's Development  (2009) 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 10  
 
small and fragmented Africa economies.
24
 These economists have argued that a larger African 
market would be good for future economic planning and development across all the sectors, let 
alone industrialisation. Regional integration was therefore considered as a key element in post-
colonial Africa’s efforts to achieve economic development and poverty reduction.25   
 
For the purposes of this mini thesis, it will be important at this early stage to distinguish regional 
integration and market or economic integration. These words will be used frequently in the 
subsequent paragraphs and chapters. Regional integration, generally, is a legal arrangement 
between countries within a given geographical area, involving co-operation in areas like trade, 
investment, migration, infrastructural development, industrialisation, and the economic, fiscal 
and monetary policies of the countries involved, whereas market or economic integration refers 
to the actual process by which economic barriers against exchange of goods, services, capital and 
labour between two or more countries are eliminated or reduced.
26
 
 
The idea to integrate African economies became alive in the 1970s. African states, under the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with sponsorship from the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) promoted an initiative towards Africa’s integration. The 
initiative, subsequently, led to the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in April 1980. 
The LPA proposed a framework for the rapid industrialisation of the African continent by 
dividing it into several regional integration areas that would later become one united economy.
27
 
                                            
24
 For instance, in 1968, Green and Seidman argued that African continental economic unity must be achieved if the 
continent was to be able to compete against the other continents on the global platform. They argued that that the 
small and fragmented African economies may perform better if they were unified or connected through market 
integration. They further argued that the unification of these small and fragmented markets would create a large 
economy for trade in goods, and thereby stimulate and increase production. 
(See Green H & Seidman  A Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (1968) 23 available at: 
http://econ.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/gerardo-serra-hope-seminar-continental-visions.original.pdf.  
(accessed 29 March 2016)).  
 
25
 Since the 1960s, there had been calls that regional integration, political solidarity and self-reliance were answers 
to the continent’s economic woes.  
(See. Erasmus G ‘Legal and institutional aspects of the Tripartite Free Trade Area: the need for effective 
implementation’ in Hartzenberg T (Ed) The Tripartite Free Trade Area-towards a new African integration 
paradigm? (2012) 8). 
 
26
 Mutai H ‘Memberships in multiple regional trading agreements: Legal implications for the conduct of trade 
negotiations’ (2003) 16  available at :www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?=1914  (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
27
 WTO Report (2011) 151. 
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In accordance with the LPA, UNECA supported the realisation of three regional integration 
arrangements (RIAs). These are: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA);
28
 and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
29
 
 
Regional integration received further impetus in 1991 when the OAU adopted the African 
Economic Community (AEC) Treaty.
30
  The AEC Treaty (Abuja Treaty)
31
 provides a roadmap 
for regional integration on the African continent, with the ultimate objective of establishing the 
AEC, by the year 2028.
32
 In pursuance of this objective, the Abuja Treaty identified eight 
regional economic communities (RECs) on the continent as building blocks for the African 
integration process.
33
 
 
Of the eight building blocks identified by the Abuja Treaty, three are situated in the eastern and 
southern parts of the continent. These are: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). In June, 2015, the Heads of State and Government representing the 
member states or partner states in these three RECs signed the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
(TFTA) Agreement. The TFTA Agreement, as we will discuss in the next chapter, is an 
arrangement aimed at establishing a free trade area among these three RECs, in order to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
28
 As it will be observed later on in this study, the PTA was subsequently transformed to become COMESA. 
 
29
 WTO Report (2011) 151.  
To complete the geographical coverage of the continent, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was also established, later 
in 1989. The AMU comprised the Arabic-speaking countries in the northern part of Africa. 
 
30
 The AEC Treaty was adopted in Abuja Nigeria and entered into force in 1994. 
 
31
 The AEC Treaty is commonly referred to as the ‘Abuja Treaty’ because it was signed in Abuja, Nigeria. 
 
32
 Luke D & Mevel S The Option of a Framework Agreement in the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) 
Negotiations: A Non-paper (Unpublished paper from African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) and UNECA, May 2015) 
3  available at: http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/cfta_framework_agreement_non-paper-
rev1_en.pdf (accessed 29 April 2016). 
 
33
 These RECs are: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African Community 
(EAC); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Community of Sahel–Saharan States 
(CENSAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). 
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stimulate and promote intra-Africa trade. The TFTA initiative has also been recognised by the 
African Union (AU) as being in tandem with the AU’s vision under the Abuja Treaty, to 
establish one continent-wide economic community.
34
  
 
Having made this introduction to African regional integration initiatives, the rest of this chapter 
will discuss the three RECs in the TFTA, thus, COMESA, EAC and SADC. The chapter will 
highlight the origins and objectives of each of the three RECs and their current memberships. Of 
utmost significance to this study, the chapter will also discuss the important institutions that have 
been established in the three REC and the functions which they perform.   
 
 
2.2. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
 
2.2.1. Background of COMESA 
 
COMESA is a regional economic community comprising countries situated in the eastern and 
southern parts of Africa. Its major aim is to promote regional integration through trade 
development, and the development of human and natural resources for the benefit of its people.
35
 
 
It will be observed in the subsequent paragraphs when considering the other two RECs in the 
TFTA that COMESA was largely formed as a result of trade or commerce related needs.
36
  It 
will also be noted that SADC was formed out of a need for political solidarity and economic 
                                            
34
 See. Preamble to the Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement. 
 
35
 Ngwenya S et al  (Eds) Key Issues in Regional integration Vol 2 (2013)  1  available at: 
http://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/key-issues-on-intergration-ii_final_toc_30th-oct_email.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2016).   
As stated earlier, COMESA came from the PTA which was a product of  an initiative by UNECA to establish a RIA 
that will constitute one unified continental economic community.  
 
36
 Hess R & Hess S ‘Regional Integration Arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa-Confusion grows’ 
Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics, Issue No. 43  2  
available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k3w8fb9ppr8.pdf?expires=1458903383&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=620BB2DF8A4827FC110FB78625A410E7 (accessed 29 March 2016). 
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independence, whereas for EAC, it was the desire to achieve political and economic union of the 
original three countries.
37
   
 
The origins of COMESA can be traced back from 1965, when UNECA convened a ministerial 
meeting for newly independent states in eastern Africa, to explore the possibility of establishing 
a mechanism to promote economic integration among them.
38
   This ministerial meeting 
recommended the establishment of an economic community covering parts of east and central 
Africa. However, overt steps towards the establishment of a regional economic body only begun 
in 1978.
39
 In 1978, another ministerial meeting held in Zambia adopted a declaration of intent 
and commitment toward the establishment of a Preferential Trade Area
40
 for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (PTA).
41
 Subsequently, a treaty establishing the PTA was signed on 21 
December 1981, at a meeting of Heads of States and Government.
42
 The ultimate objective of the 
PTA was the establishment of one economic community, taking advantage of the larger market 
size of its region. 
 
In the early 1990s, the PTA decided to move further with its integration agenda, and a decision 
was therefore made by the PTA countries’ Heads of State and Government, in January 1992, to 
transform the PTA into a common market covering eastern and southern Africa.
43
 Accordingly, 
                                            
37
 Kritzinger-van Nierken L  & Pinto Moreira E ‘Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Overview of Recent 
Development’. Discussion paper 33107 (2002)  1  available at: 
 http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=US2012411917 (accessed 28 March 2016). 
 
38
 About COMESA   available at:  http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95. 
(accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
39
 About COMESA.  
 
 
40
 A preferential trade area refers to an area covered by two or more countries where goods produced in the area are 
subject to lower trade barriers or preferential treatment than those goods that have been produced from outside the 
area. 
 
41
 About COMESA. 
 
42
 About COMESA.  
The PTA Treaty came into force on 30 September 1982. 
 
43
 FAO Repository Documents. The Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa  Appendix 2C  
available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/w5973e/w5973e06.htm.  (accessed 29 March 2016).  
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in 1994, PTA member states signed the COMESA Treaty which established COMESA to replace 
the PTA.
44
   
 
The COMESA Treaty spells out a wide range of aims and objectives. However, because of its 
history, COMESA’s main focus has always been on the formation of a large economic trading 
bloc that is capable of promoting trade and integration among its members.
45
 In line with this 
trade promotion agenda, on 31 October 2000, COMESA launched its free trade area (FTA).
46
  A 
tariff reduction schedule had already been adopted in 1992.
47
  Furthermore, in 2009, COMESA 
launched a customs union,
48
 with a three year implementation plan.
49
 However, the customs 
union has not yet been operationalised.
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
44
 The COMESA Treaty was signed on 5 November 1993. The COMESA Treaty was formally ratified on 8 
December, 1994, in Lilongwe, Malawi. 
 
45
 The Preamble to the COMESA Treaty. 
 
46
 A free trade area (FTA) is a legal arrangement for trade in goods and services in which substantially all trade 
among its members is liberalised. FTAs are mostly entered into in accordance with Art. XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 
47
 About COMESA.  
The tariff liberalisation program to eliminate tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to inter-regional trade had initially 
commenced in 1984. 
 
48
 A customs union is an FTA that has a Common External Tariff (CET). Similarly to FTAs, customs unions are also 
entered into in accordance with Art XXIV of the GATT. 
 
49
 Available at:  http://www.comesabusinesscouncil.org/comesabusinesscouncil/?q=Customs%20Union (accessed 
29 March 2016). 
 
50
  About COMESA.  
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2.2.2. Membership in COMESA 
 
Currently, COMESA consists of the following 19 member states: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
51
  
It should be noted that after the PTA was transformed to become COMESA in 1994, what 
followed next were several membership changes. These changes may have occurred as a 
consequence of the PTA’s transformation from a mere preferential trade area to a common 
market,
52
 as well as regional integration developments, elsewhere, within the region. It will be 
observed later in this chapter that it is also around this same period of time that both the EAC 
and SADC also launched their FTAs.
53
 The developments in the EAC and SADC had an effect 
on COMESA because, during this period, some countries withdrew their COMESA 
memberships.  
In 1997, both Lesotho and Mozambique withdrew their membership of COMESA. But in 1998, 
Egypt joined COMESA by acceding to the COMESA Treaty.
54
 In 2000, Tanzania withdrew its 
membership of COMESA. In 2003, Namibia also withdrew its membership of COMESA and 
was followed by Angola in 2007. Somalia has become a defacto non-member of COMESA due 
to the lack of a legitimate political leadership in that country since 1991.
55
 Most of the countries 
                                            
51
 About COMESA.  
 
52
 Establishing a Preferential Trade Area is less complicated when compared to establishing a Common Market 
because the former involves mostly negative integration whereas the latter includes positive integration in addition 
to negative integration. It has been explained that negative integration merely involves the elimination of obstacles 
to trade among members whereas positive integration also involves a more complex policy harmonisation and co-
ordination among the members.  
(See. Luwan D ‘Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa countries: Multiplicity of membership issues and 
choices’ African Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 18(2) (2010) 217). 
 
53
 EAC and SADC launched their FTAs in 2005 and 2000, respectively. 
 
54
 Masriya A ‘Q and A :What is COMESA?’  Egypt Independent online newspaper  31 March 2015   
available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/q-and-what-comesa (accessed 29 March 2016).  
However, Egypt started applying custom exemptions to imports from other COMESA member states in 1999. 
 
55
 Mshomba R E Africa in the Global Economy (2000) 183. 
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that withdrew their membership of COMESA during this time, for instance Tanzania,
56
 cited the 
high costs of maintaining their memberships of two RECs whose objectives, seemingly, became 
similar.
57
 However, all the countries that withdrew their COMESA membership elected to 
maintain their SADC memberships.
58
  
With a membership of 19, COMESA is therefore the largest REC in the TFTA, in terms of both 
membership and size. It covers a geographical area of approximately, 12 million square 
kilometres and a population of over 470.26 million.
59
 The COMESA Secretariat is based in 
Lusaka, Zambia. There is also a strong possibility that South Sudan
60
 may accede to the 
COMESA Treaty, eventually making the total membership of 20 countries. 
However, only 11 member states are part of the COMESA FTA, and these are: Burundi, 
Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
61
 
                                            
56
 The then Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa cited burdensome membership fees and lack of adequate research 
into the effect of regional integration as some of the reasons for polling out of COMESA.   
See. online article available at: http//www.times-publications.com/publications/corporate_africa/articles/mkapahtml 
(accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
57
 It was argued that it was better to maintain membership of a single REC than incur a lot of financial and human 
resources costs of two memberships. Most countries chose to remain in SADC because of the obvious trade benefits 
they got from trading with post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
58
 Richard Hess and Simon Hess argued that the reason why many countries elected to maintain their SADC 
membership and terminate their COMESA membership was because they were lured by the enticing carrot of the 
South African market.  
(See Hess R & Hess S ‘Regional Integration Arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa-Confusion grows’ 
Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics, Issue No. 43  2 available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k3w8fb9ppr8.pdf?expires=1458903383&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=620BB2DF8A4827FC110FB78625A410E7 (accessed 29 March 2016)). 
 
59
 About COMESA. 
 
60
 COMESA reported that its Secretary General, Mr. Sindiso Ngwenya, led a COMESA delegation to the Republic 
of South Sudan from 29 September 2015 to 1 October 2015 to consult with the government of South Sudan on the 
long awaited integration of South Sudan into COMESA  available at:  
  http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1697:south-sudan-initial-steps-to-join-
comesa&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41 (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
61
 These 11 countries have already eliminated tariffs on goods and are now working on the eventual elimination of 
quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers. 
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In as far as overlapping membership with other RECs in the TFTA is concerned, several 
COMESA member states are also members of the other two RECs. Four COMESA member 
states are partner states of the EAC,
62
 whereas eight other member states are in SADC.
63
  
 
2.2.3. COMESA institutions and their functions 
 
The objectives of COMESA which focus on promoting economic integration and trade are 
reflected in the institutions which its treaty has established. For instance, this mini thesis will 
later observe that the absence of a legislative institution or platform in the COMESA is perhaps 
an indication that its major focus of COMESA is economic integration and trade. The goals for 
the establishment of COMESA were largely motivated by economic rather than political 
considerations. 
 
Art.7 of the COMESA Treaty establishes the following institutions: (a) the Authority; (b) the 
Council; (c) the Court of Justice; (d) the Committee of Governors of Central Banks; (d) Inter-
governmental Committee; (e) Technical Committees; (f) the Secretariat; and (g) the Consultative 
Committee of the Business Community and Other Interest Groups. 
 
First, Art.8 of the COMESA Treaty provides for the composition and functions of the 
Authority.
64
 The Authority consists of the Heads of State and Government of COMESA member 
states and is mainly responsible for the general policy directions and control of the executive 
functions of COMESA.
65
 The Authority is mandated to meet once every year.
66
  
                                            
62
 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda are EAC partner states. 
 
63
 The DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of 
SADC. 
 
64
 Art. 8 (1) states that the Authority is the supreme decision making organ of COMESA. 
 
65
 Art.8(2) of the COMESA Treaty. Art.8 (3) of the Treaty further provides that, all decisions made by the Authority 
shall be binding on the member states. 
 
66
 Art.8(5) of the COMESA Treaty. The Summit may also hold an extraordinary meeting at the request of any 
member of the Authority, provided that such request is supported by one-third of the members of the Authority. 
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Secondly, the Council of Ministers is provided for under Art.9 of the COMESA Treaty. The 
Council of Ministers consists of such Ministers as may be designated, from time to time, by each 
member state.
67
 The function of the Council is to constantly monitor and review the proper 
functioning and development of COMESA in accordance with its treaty objectives and may also 
make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, give directions and opinions, and make 
recommendations.
68
 The Council meets once every year, immediately preceding a meeting of the 
Authority, but may also hold extraordinary meetings at the request of member states.
69
 
 
Thirdly, the Court of Justice is established under Art.19 of the COMESA Treaty.
70
 The 
COMESA Court of Justice bears the responsibility of interpreting and applying the COMESA 
Treaty.
71
 The Court has jurisdiction over all matters referred to it by COMESA member states,
72
 
the Secretary General of COMESA,
73
 natural and legal persons,
74
 employees of COMESA,
75
 
arbitration tribunals
76
 and national courts.
77
 
 
Fourthly, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks is another specialised trade related 
institution peculiar to COMESA.
78
 Unlike in the EAC and SADC, COMESA has established a 
                                            
67
 Art. 9 (1) of the COMESA Treaty. The designation of the Ministers is dependent on the subject- matter that will 
be discussed at that meeting. 
 
68
 Art. 9 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
69
 Art. 9 (4) of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
70
 The COMESA Court of Justice became operational in 1998 and is based in Khartoum, Sudan. 
 
71
 Art. 19 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
72
 Art. 24 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
73
 Art. 25 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
74
 Art. 26 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
75
 Art. 27 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
76
 Art. 28 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
77
 Arts. 29 and 30 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
78
 The roles of the Committee are stipulated under Art. 17 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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Committee of Governors of Central Banks with the responsibility of developing programmes and 
action plans in the field of finance and monetary co-operation.
79
 
 
Fifthly, Art.14 of the COMESA Treaty provides for an Inter-governmental Committee 
comprising principal secretaries or permanent secretaries from the member states. The function 
of this Committee is to develop programmes and action plans in all other sectors of co-operation, 
other than finance and monetary sectors.
80
  
 
Sixthly, Art.15 of the COMESA Treaty provides for the functions of sectoral technical 
committees in various fields, such as, agriculture, tourism and wildlife, energy, transport and 
communication, among others. These committees are put in place, as and when necessary, in 
order to ensure the attainment of the objectives of COMESA.
81
 
 
Seventhly, Art.17 of the COMESA Treaty makes provision for the COMESA Secretariat. The 
Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General who also acts as the Chief Executive Officer of 
COMESA.
82
 The Secretary General represents COMESA as a legal personality and also serves 
and assists the other organs of COMESA in the performance of their functions.
83
  
 
Lastly, Art.18 of the COMESA Treaty makes provision for a Consultative Committee of the 
Business Community and Other Interest Groups. The purpose of this Committee is to ensure that 
the voice of the private sector, civil society and other interest groups is heard and taken into 
consideration by COMESA.
84
 
 
                                            
79
 Art.13 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
80
 Art.14 (1) of the COMESA Treaty. This is probably so because matters of finance and monetary sectors are left in 
the hands of the Committee of Governors of Central Banks. 
 
81
 Arts.15 and 16 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
82
 Art.16 (2) of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
83
 Art.16 (8) (a) and (f) of the COMESA Treaty.  
 
84
 Art. 18 (3) (a) of the COMESA Treaty. 
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Apart from the institutions provided for under the treaty, COMESA has also established other 
trade specialised institutions using other legal instruments.
85
 These institutions are: (a) the 
Competition Commission; (b) the Trade and Development Bank for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(PTA Bank);
86
 (c) the Clearing House; (d) the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI); (e) the 
COMESA Regional Investment Agency; (f) the Alliance Commodity Trade in Eastern and 
Southern Africa (ACTESA); and (g) the Leather and Leather Products Institute (LLPI). 
 
This mini thesis observes that, unlike the other two RECs, COMESA is largely focussed on 
furthering market integration. COMESA’s current strategy, ‘economic prosperity through 
regional integration’ sums it all up.87 COMESA’s objectives focus on economic integration and 
trade. As it will be later observed, the EAC and SADC focus on regional integration in many 
other sectors in addition to economic integration and trade.  
 
In addition, COMESA’s focus on economic integration and trade this difference also manifests 
itself in the type of institutions that it established. For instance, COMESA is the only REC, 
among the three, that has a special institution of the Committee of Central Bank Governors.  
Furthermore, there is no parliamentary forum in COMESA, whereas the other two RECs have 
established regional legislative forums.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
85
 About COMESA. 
available at: http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95. (accessed 29 March 
2016).  
 
86
 The Bank is a trade and investment institution of COMESA which was established under the PTA in 1985.  More 
information on the PTA Bank is available at: http://www.ptabank.org/index.php/bank-profile#.VvXJB-J96M8 
(accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
87
 About COMESA. 
available at: http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95 (accessed 29 March 
2016). 
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2.3. The East African Community (EAC) 
 
2.3.1  Background of the EAC 
 
The EAC is another REC in the TFTA and consists of six countries that are situated in the 
eastern part of Africa.
88
 The EAC is the smallest REC in the TFTA but the most advanced REC 
in terms of regional integration.
89
  Unlike COMESA and SADC, the EAC has successfully 
implemented its Customs Union since 2005.
90
 In addition to that, from January 2010, the EAC 
became a Common Market,
91
 and subsequently, adopted a Protocol establishing the East African 
Monetary Union, in November 2013.
92
 
 
The origins of the EAC can be traced back from the early 1900s, when the modern day Kenya 
and Uganda, were a British colony and a British protectorate, respectively. In 1917, the British 
Government, which governed the two territories, established a Customs Union between these 
two territories.
93
  Subsequently, in 1927, modern day Tanzania, then a British trust territory, 
joined the Customs Union.
94
  Later in 1948, these three territories launched what was called the 
East African High Commission (EAHC).
95
  
                                            
88
 Some references to EAC membership and size in this study may exclude the membership of South Sudan, which 
only acceded to the EAC Treaty on the 15 April 2016, just as this study was being concluded. 
 
89
 The EAC is the smallest REC in terms of population and membership sizes. 
 
90
 Available at: http://www.eac.int/integration-pillars/customs-union. (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
91
 In regional integration, a Common Market is a further step after a customs union, where the countries involved in 
the arrangement allow for the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. 
 
92
 A monetary union is a regional integration step, usually after a common market, where the countries involved 
share a common currency or decide to peg their exchange rates in order to keep the value of their currency at a 
certain level. Available at: http://www.eac.int/integration-pillars/monetary-union. (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
93
 Nshimbi C C ‘Oscillations: Short-term domestic policy considerations and Regional integration in South-east Asia 
and Southern Africa’ Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Global South Caucus (GSCIS) 
Conference, 2015 Singapore. 8-10 January 2015. 10 available at: 
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/GSCIS%20Singapore%202015/Archive/c555e841-40b5-41b7-b702-
2e3bea13fe01.pdf. (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
94
 Tanganyika was a British trust territory from 1916 to 1964, when it attained its independence. 
 
95
 The Secretariate of the EAHC was based in Nairobi, Kenya. 
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In 1961, the EAHC was transformed into the East African Common Services Organisation 
(EACSO). EACSO was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the affairs of the common 
market, finance, economics and planning, social affairs and services and communication.
96
 In 
1967, after the three countries obtained their independence from Great Britain, the EACSO was 
transformed into the East African Community (EAC).
97
  As EAC, the three countries jointly ran 
agricultural, education and tax services enacted by a Central Legislative Assembly.
98
  The 
countries also enjoyed fiscal integration through a monetary union overseen by the East African 
Currency Board.
99
  
 
However, in 1977 the EAC was dissolved due to conflicts between the members as regards the 
mode of co-operation among the three countries.
100
 The EAC was re-established in 1999 after 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed a new treaty.
101
 The EAC was re-established in order to 
strengthen the economic, social, cultural, political, technological and other ties for the fast, 
balanced and sustainable development of the region.
102
  
 
Art. 5 of the EAC Treaty provides that the objectives of EAC shall be to develop policies and 
programmes aimed at widening co-operation among the partner states
103
 in political, economic, 
social, and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial 
affairs for the mutual benefit of the countries. It adds that in pursuance of this objective, the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
96
 Nshimbi (2015) 10. 
 
97
 Nshimbi (2015) 10.  
Also see the Preamble to the EAC Treaty. 
 
98
 Preamble to the EAC Treaty. 
 
99
 The countries also used a common currency that was established in 1919.  
 
100
 The EAC was dissolved in 1977 due to conflicts between the partners including the war between Uganda and 
Tanzania. The EAC was formally dissolved in 1983. On 14 May 1984, the three countries went on to sign the 
Mediation Agreement that made provision for the division of assets and liabilities of the dissolved EAC. 
 
101
 The new EAC Treaty became effective in 2000. 
 
102
 Preamble to the EAC Treaty. 
 
103
 Art. 3(1) of the EAC Treaty defines the countries that are members of EAC as ‘Partner States’. 
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partner states will undertake to establish a Customs Union, a Common Market, a Monetary 
Union, and ultimately a Political Federation.
104
 
 
From the above discussion, this mini thesis observes that, unlike COMESA, the objectives of 
EAC are much wider and cover areas other than just economic or market integration.
105
  
 
 
2.3.2. Membership in the EAC 
 
The original EAC partner states are: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These three countries also 
signed the treaty re-establishing the EAC on 30 November 1999. 
 
On 1 July 2007, Burundi and Rwanda joined the EAC by acceding to the EAC Treaty. These two 
countries joined the EAC Customs Union on 1 July 2009.
106
 Recently, on 15 April 2016, South 
Sudan acceded to the EAC Treaty making the current EAC membership rise to six.
107
 It was also 
reported that Sudan and the DRC had at one time expressed interest to join EAC, but their 
applications were rejected on the ground that both countries did not share their borders with the 
EAC.
108
 
 
As of 2016, before the accession of South Sudan, the EAC covered an area of approximately 
1.82 million square kilometres (including the area covered by water), with a population of 
approximately 145 million people.
109
 The EAC partner states had a combined Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of approximately US$ 147 billion.
110
 
                                            
104
 Art. 5 (2) of the EAC Treaty. 
 
105
 EAC includes areas like social, cultural, technological and even political integration. 
 
106
 History of EAC available at: http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-history (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
107
 About EAC quick facts  available at http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-quick-facts- (accessed 6 May 2016). 
 
108
 Hansohm D & Kwinga L ‘Institutional Anchoring of Regional Integration in East African Community’ 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2012 (2013) 215 available at: 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/09/Final-2012-MRI-for-web_Part-1.pdf. (accessed  29 March 2016). 
 
109
 Available at: http://www.eac.int/about/overview. (accessed 29 May 2016).  
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As regards overlapping memberships with other RECs in the TFTA, Tanzania, a founding 
partner of the EAC, is a member of SADC.
111
  Other four partners: Burundi, Kenya Rwanda and 
Uganda, are COMESA members.
112
   
 
 
2.3.3. EAC institutions and their functions 
The EAC was formed as a result of a mixture of political, economic and social need for 
unification. These reasons are conspicuous in the institutions which the EAC Treaty has 
established. Art. 9 (1) of the EAC Treaty establishes the following institutions: (a) the Summit; 
(b) the Council; (c) the Co-ordination Committee; (d) Sectoral committees; (d) the East African 
Court of Justice; (e) the East African Legislative Assembly; (f) the Secretariat; and (g) such other 
organs as may be established by the Summit. 
 
First, Art. 10 of the EAC Treaty provides for the composition of the Summit. The Summit 
consists of the Heads of State and Government of the partner states. Its major function is to give 
general directions and impetus to the development and achievement of the EAC objectives.
113
  
The Summit meets once every year.
114
   
 
Secondly, Art. 13 of the EAC Treaty makes provision for the Council. The Council comprises 
the following members: (a) Minister responsible for EAC affairs in each partner state; (b) such 
other Minister of the partner state as each partner state may determine; and (c) the Attorney 
                                                                                                                                            
The information in this paragraph excludes data from South Sudan which was not available on the EAC website at 
the time of concluding this study. 
 
110
 Available at: http://www.eac.int/about/overview. (accessed 29 May 2016). 
 
111
 Tanzania was one of the founding member states of SADC, and was also a member of SADCC, the precursor of 
SADC. 
 
112
 As it has been noted earlier, South Sudan may soon accede to the COMESA Treaty, hence the number of EAC 
countries in COMESA will rise to six. 
 
113
 Art. 11 (1) of the EAC Treaty.  The Summit is, in other words, the supreme decision making organ of EAC. 
 
114
 Art. 12(1) of the EAC Treaty.  However, the Summit may hold an extraordinary meeting at the request of any 
member of the Summit. 
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General of each partner state. The function of the Council is to promote, monitor and constantly 
review the implementation of the programmes of the EAC, and ensure the proper functioning 
and development of the EAC.
115
  In addition to making regulations and issuing directives,
116
 the 
Council also initiates and submits Bills to the EAC Legislative Assembly, as provided under 
Art.14(3) (b) of the EAC Treaty.
117
 
 
Thirdly, Art.17 of the EAC Treaty provides for the Co-ordination Committee. This Committee 
consists of permanent secretaries responsible for EAC affairs in each partner state and such other 
permanent secretaries in each partner state, as it may determine. The main function of the Co-
ordination Committee is to implement the decisions made by the Council.
118
   
 
Fourthly, Art.20 of the EAC Treaty makes provision for the establishment of sectoral 
committees, whose functions and composition depends on the purpose of their establishment. 
These committees submit their sectoral reports and recommendations to the Co-ordination 
Committee.
119
 
 
Fifthly, Art.23 of the EAC Treaty makes provision for the Court of Justice. This Court is the 
judicial arm of the EAC, charged with the responsibility of ensuring adherence to the law and the 
interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty.
120
 The EAC Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
                                            
115
 Art.14 (2) of the EAC Treaty. Under Art 14(4) of the EAC Treaty, the Council has power to seek an advisory 
opinion from the EAC Court of Justice on any matter of the EAC Treaty. 
 
116
 Art.13 (3) (d) of the EAC Treaty. 
 
117
 Art.16 of the EAC Treaty provides that the regulations, directives, etc made by the Council shall bind all organs 
and institutions of the EAC, except the Summit, the Court, the Legislative Assembly, and any person or institution 
to whom they are addressed. 
 
118
 Art. (a) of the EAC Treaty. The Committee also submit reports and recommendations to the Council on the 
implementation of the Treaty. 
 
119
 Art.21 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
120
 Art.36 of the EAC Treaty also gives the EAC court jurisdiction to entertain advisory opinions from the Summit, 
the Council, or any partner state any question of law regarding the proper interpretation or application of the EAC 
Treaty. 
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over matters referred to it by member states,
121
 the EAC Secretary General,
122
 natural and legal 
persons,
123
 employees of the EAC,
124
 arbitration tribunals
125
 and national courts.
126
 
 
Sixthly, Art.48 of the EAC Treaty makes provision for the Legislative Assembly. The EAC 
Legislative Assembly consists of both elected and ex-officio members.
127
 In addition to its 
legislative function, the Legislative Assembly debates and approves EAC budgets.
128
 
Seventhly, Art.66 of the EAC Treaty makes provision for the Secretariat, the executive organ of 
the EAC.
129
 The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General who acts as the chief accounting 
officer of the EAC and the secretary of the Summit.
130
 The EAC Secretariat is based in Arusha, 
Tanzania. The Secretariat is responsible for the general administration and financial management 
of the EAC, as well as managing and monitoring all programmes implemented by the 
Community.
131
   
 
Lastly, Art.9 (1)(h) makes provision for the establishment of other organs or institutions as may 
be determined by the Summit.
132
  
                                            
121
 Art.28 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
122
 Art.29 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
123
 Art.30 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
124
 Art.31 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
125
 Art.32 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
126
 Arts.33 and 34 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
127
 It consists of: (a) nine elected members from each partner state; and (b) the Minister responsible for EAC affairs 
in the partner states and their respective deputies; and (c) the EAC Secretary General and the Counsel to the 
Community. 
 
128
 Art. 49 (2) of the EAC Treaty. 
 
129
 The Secretariat consists of the Secretary General, Deputy Secretaries General, Counsel to the Community and 
other offices as may be deemed necessary by the Council. 
 
130
 Art. 67 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
131
 Art. 71 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
132
 In line of this, EAC has also established the following institutions: (a) the Civil Aviation Safety and Security 
Oversight Agency (CASSOA); (b) the East African Development Bank (EADB); the East African Health Research 
 
 
 
 
Page | 27  
 
This mini thesis observes that the institutions that have been established in the EAC Treaty 
reflect a community of states aimed at integration and co-operation in many areas, other than just 
market integration. For instance, unlike the COMESA Treaty, the EAC Treaty
133
 has established 
a Legislative Assembly as a legislative organ of the EAC. This indicates that the objectives of 
the EAC are not only market integration but also political union. After all, the ultimate objective 
of the EAC is to achieve a political federation.
134
 It is therefore submitted that the EAC 
Legislative Assembly is a critical institution towards a political federation. 
 
Furthermore, as it will be observed when discussing SADC, most institutions in the EAC appear 
similar to those in SADC. For instance, both RECs have a parliamentary forum as one of their 
institutions. It has been noted that COMESA has no such institution. It can be argued that this 
perhaps reflects the fact that both EAC and SADC aim at achieving integration and co-operation 
in other areas, apart from market integration. Unlike COMESA, the EAC and SADC also aim at 
achieving peace, unity and political solidarity, in addition to market integration. In addition, the 
EAC and SADC do not have a specialised body to oversee economic affairs like the Committee 
of Central Bank Governors in COMESA.  
 
 
2.4.  The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
 
2.4.1.  Background of SADC 
 
SADC has its origins in the early 1980s, when several independent frontline southern African 
states
135
 established the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). 
                                                                                                                                            
Commission (EAHRC); the East African Kiswahili Commission (EAKC); the East African Science and Technology 
Commission (EASTECO); the Inter-University Council of East Africa (IUCEA); the Lake Victoria Basin 
Commission (LVBC); and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO). 
 
133
 Art. 47 of the EAC Treaty. 
 
134
 Art. 5 (2) of the EAC Treaty. 
 
135
 These SADCC frontline states included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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SADCC was established in order for its members to achieve political solidarity and attain 
economic independence from the then apartheid South Africa.
136
   
 
Market integration was not an objective of SADCC. However, in the early 1990s, market 
integration became necessary. SADCC countries saw the need to revisit their objectives in order 
to properly integrate post-apartheid South Africa into their community. Unsurprisingly, in 
August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia, the Heads of State and Government representing SADCC 
member states signed the SADC Declaration and Treaty that effectively transformed SADCC 
into SADC.
137
 The rationale was not just to drop the second ‘C’, but that SADC should act as a 
vehicle for achieving regional integration and development of the people in southern Africa, 
South Africa inclusive.
138
 
 
The main objectives of SADC are: achievement of development and economic growth; 
alleviation of poverty; enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the people of southern 
Africa; and support of the socially disadvantaged, through regional integration.
139
 The other 
objectives of SADC include: promotion of peace and security; achieving sustainable use of 
natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and strengthening and 
consolidating the long-standing historical, social and cultural links of the people of southern 
Africa.
140
 
 
Of the above-mentioned objectives, SADC’s approach to regional integration appears to follow a 
sectoral development approach, rather than purely market integration.
141
 As was noted earlier, 
                                            
136
  Kritzinger-van Nierken L  & Pinto Moreira E (2002) 2. 
 
137
 Preamble to the SADC Treaty. 
 
138
 Preamble to the SADC Treaty. 
 
139
 Art.5 of the SADC Treaty. These objectives are to be achieved through increased regional integration, built on 
democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development. 
 
140
 Art.5 (1) of the SADC Treaty. 
 
141
 Kritzinger-van Nierken L  &  Pinto Moreira E (2002)  2. 
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SADC’s integration approach appears similar to the one adopted in the EAC. But COMESA’s 
approach is different, as it emphasises on market integration.  
 
However, due to changes in the national, regional and global environments, market integration is 
slowly becoming one of the core objectives of SADC. This manifested itself prominently in 
1996, when SADC adopted a protocol on trade. The SADC Protocol on Trade, launched in 2000, 
established an FTA among the SADC countries that signed it.
142
 Furthermore, in 2001, SADC 
signed and adopted the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)
143
 which 
stipulates the vision of SADC to ultimately establish a Common Market among its member 
states. 
 
2.4.2. Membership in SADC 
 
As discussed in the above paragraphs, there were nine original frontline states that established 
SADCC in 1980. These were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1992, when the SADC Treaty was signed, the original nine 
members had added Namibia to their fold, making it a 10-member state grouping.
144
 By 2000, 
the membership of SADC had risen to 14 with the addition of South Africa, Mauritius, DRC and 
Seychelles.
145
 Madagascar was the latest member to join SADC in 2005. 
 
                                            
142
 As a result of the market integration objective reflected through the adoption of the SADC Protocol on Trade, the 
integration agenda of SADC became more and more similar to the COMESA objectives. 
 
143
 The RISDP was adopted at a SADC Heads of State and Government meeting on 14 August 2001, at Blantyre, in 
Malawi. The plan, which is based on the strategic priorities of SADC and the common agenda, is designed to 
provide strategic direction with respect to SADC projects, programmes and activities.  
Available at: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/#SADCC (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
144
  About SADC  available at: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/#SADCC (accessed 29 
March 2016). 
 
145
 South Africa joined SADC in 1994, Mauritius in 1996, and the DRC and Mauritius in 1998.  Seychelles opted to 
pull out of SADC in 2004, but applied to rejoin in 2006. She was re-admitted in 2007. It should also be mentioned 
that in 2007, Rwanda also applied to join SADC but it subsequently cancelled its application. 
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Currently, SADC covers an area of approximately 554 919 square kilometres and has a 
population of approximately 277 million people.
146
 SADC also boasts of a combined GDP of 
approximately US$ 575.5 billion.
147
 
 
Some SADC member states have maintained their memberships in the other two TFTA RECs.  
Tanzania is still a member of the EAC, whereas eight other members are in COMESA.
148
  
 
 
2.4.3 SADC institutions and their functions 
 
In order to achieve economic development and reduce poverty through regional integration, the 
SADC Treaty has established several institutions.  Art.9 of the SADC Treaty, as amended in 
2001, establishes the following institutions: (a) the Summit of Heads of State and Government; 
(b) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; (c) the Council of Ministers; (d) 
sectoral and cluster ministerial committees; (e) Secretariat; (f) Tribunal; (g) the Troika; (h) 
Standing Committees of officials; and (i) SADC national committees. 
 
Art.10 of the SADC Treaty makes provision for the Summit of Heads of State and Government. 
The Summit consists of the Heads of State and Government of the member states and meets at 
least twice every year. Being the supreme policy making institution, the Summit is responsible 
for the overall direction and control of the functions of SADC.
149
   
 
                                            
146
 About SADC  available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/ (accessed 29 March 
2016). 
 
 
147
 About SADC  available at: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/ (accessed 29 March 
2016).  
It should also be pointed out that Angola and DRC are not taking part in the SADC FTA.  
 
148
 These are: DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of 
COMESA. 
 
149
 Art.10 (2) of the SADC Treaty. 
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It is also important to mention that in accordance with Art.9 (1) of the SADC Treaty, SADC has 
successfully implemented a Troika system, comprising the Chairperson, the incoming 
Chairperson and the outgoing Chairperson. The Troika makes policy decisions on behalf of 
SADC in the period between the SADC meetings. The Troika plays a critical role and has proved 
effective in SADC, as it reduces the frequency of extraordinary Summit meetings and therefore 
reduces costs.
150
 The Troika system is also replicated in a few organs of SADC, like the Council, 
the integrated Committee of Ministers, and the Committee of Senior Officials.
151
 
 
Art.10A of the SADC Treaty makes provision for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
Co-operation. The function of the Organ is to support the achievement and maintenance of peace 
and security and the rule of law in the SADC region.
152
 
 
Art.11 of the SADC Treaty provides for the Council of Ministers, preferably Ministers 
responsible for foreign affairs in the member states. The Council of Ministers is mainly 
responsible for overseeing the functioning and development of SADC.
153
  
 
Art.12 of the SADC Treaty makes provision for sectoral and cluster ministerial committees on 
various areas of integration. These areas of integration include: trade, investment and finance; 
food, agriculture, natural resources and environment, infrastructure and services, and legal affairs 
and judicial matters.  
 
Art.13 of the SADC Treaty also makes provision for the Standing Committee of Senior 
Official.
154
 The Committee principally acts as a technical advisory committee to the Council. 
                                            
150
 Saurombe A. ‘The Role of SADC Institutions in implementing SADC Treaty provisions dealing with Regional 
Integration’ PELJ (2012) Vol 15 (2) 463. 
 
151
 Saurombe A. (2012) 463. 
 
152
 Available at: http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ-politics-defense-
and-security/ (accessed 29 May 2016). 
 
153
 Art. 11 (2) also provides that the Council of Ministers shall oversee the implementation of the policies of SADC 
and advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious functioning and development of 
SADC. 
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Art.14 of the SADC Treaty provides for the Secretariat. The Secretariat acts as the principal 
executive institution of SADC and is mainly responsible for strategic planning, management and 
implementation of the programmes of SADC. The Secretariat is headed by an Executive 
Secretary and is based in Gaborone, Botswana. 
 
Art.16 of the SADC Treaty makes provision for the Tribunal. The function of the Tribunal is to 
ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its 
subsidiary instruments. The Tribunal also adjudicates on such disputes as may be referred to it.
155
 
 
The SADC Treaty has also made provision for the establishment of national committees in each 
member state under Art.16A. These committees consist of key stakeholders in each country, with 
membership from government, private sector, civil society and non-governmental 
organisations.
156
 The functions of the committees include, at national level:  to provide input in 
the formulation of SADC policies, strategies and programmes; and to co-ordinate and oversee 
the implementation of SADC programmes of action. 
 
In addition, Art.9(2) of the SADC Treaty allows for the establishment of other institutions of 
SADC as it deems necessary. In accordance with this provision, SADC has established the 
SADC Parliamentary Forum. The Parliamentary Forum mainly acts as a discussion platform on 
matters of common interest to SADC member states.   
 
This mini thesis observes that SADC institutions reflects a community of states aimed at 
deepening integration in many areas of co-operation, other than market integration. This is 
evident from the established institutions like sectoral committees in different areas and the 
existence of a Parliamentary Forum. However, as reflected in the RISDP, market integration is 
still a prominent feature as SADC strives to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction.  
                                                                                                                                            
154
 The Committee consists of a permanent secretary, or an officer of equivalent rank from each member state from a 
ministry that acts as the SADC Contact Point.  
 
155
 Art. 16 of the SADC Treaty.  
It should be mentioned that SADC has recently adopted a Protocol that made some changes in the jurisdiction and 
functions of the Tribunal. 
 
156
 Art. 16A (13) of the SADC Treaty. 
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In addition to the common institutions like the Summit or Authority of Heads of State and 
Government, Council of Ministers, Secretariat, and other institutions, SADC and the EAC both 
have legislative institutions or assemblies. However, unlike COMESA, SADC does not have a 
Committee of Governors of Central Banks. 
 
 
2.5.  Conclusion 
 
In sum, this chapter has demonstrated two things that are important to this mini thesis. First, it 
has demonstrated the extent of multiplicity of REC memberships in the TFTA. It has noted that 
all the three RECs contain countries that have maintained memberships in more than one REC. 
Secondly, it has demonstrated how the three RECs have established similar regional integration 
institutions (RIIs). The following institutions have been noted to be common in all the three 
RECs: (a) Summits or Authority of Heads of State and Government as the supreme policy 
making institution; (b) Councils of Ministers responsible for overseeing the functioning of each 
REC; (c) Courts or Tribunal to interpret the respective treaties and resolve disputes; (d) 
Committees of Senior Officials or permanent secretaries; and (e) Secretariats. As it will be 
observed in the next chapter, with the exception of the secretariat, similar RIIs have been 
replicated under the TFTA Agreement. 
 
Furthermore, although efforts towards market integration in the three RECs started in different 
circumstances and were driven by different motives, the current strategies and goals are now 
becoming more and more similar and identical. There has been a replication of a similar linear 
approach to integration in the three RECs.
157
  McCarthy defined a linear approach to integration 
as the sequential phases of integrating goods, services, labour and capital from an FTA, to a 
customs union, to a common market, and finally to a monetary or fiscal union, in that order.
158
 A 
                                            
157
 All three RECs proposed to start their integration through the establishment of FTAs, then custom unions and 
lastly common markets.  
 
158
 McCarthy C ‘Reconsidering regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Hartzenberg T (Ed) Supporting 
Regional Integration in East and Southern Africa: Review of Select Issues (2010)  1  available at: 
http://www.tralac.org/publications/article/4652-supporting-regional-integration-in-east-and-southern-africa-
review-of-select-issues.html  (accessed 18 April 2016). 
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by-product of linear approach to integration in these three RECs has been the establishment of, 
arguably, similar RIIs that perform almost similar functions.  
 
Due to the similarities of the RIIs and their respective functions in these three RECs, there has 
been duplication of effort and waste of resources in Africa, most especially for those countries 
that have multiple REC memberships, as they try to fulfil their multiple obligations.
159
 It has also 
proven to be costly for member states to maintain membership in two RECs, as evidenced by the 
several countries that withdrew their COMESA memberships.
160
  
 
The duplication of efforts in the RIIs and costly dual memberships, has in some ways, inhibited 
the realisation of the full potential of intra-regional trade in Africa.
161
  Hence, came forth the 
suggestion to consolidate the three RECs into one trade regime, the TFTA. The next chapter will 
therefore be a discussion of the TFTA Agreement and the institution it envisages to establish.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
A linear approach to integration has a predetermined time frame and generates formal results, such as, secretariats, 
legal instruments and officially specified targets.(See WTO (2011) 152) 
 
159
 African Union (AU) ‘The African Union and Regional Economic Integration’ (Unpublished)  available at: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economic-integration (accessed 18 April 2016). 
 
160
 For instance, as we have noted the reason cited for the withdrawal of Tanzania from COMESA in 2000. 
However, other countries have maintained dual memberships. Some countries with dual memberships found it very 
difficult to withdraw their membership of one REC, probably because of the benefits they derive from them. (See 
Kalenga P (2011) 4). 
 
161
 Akonor K  African Economic Institutions (2009) 90. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE AREA (TFTA) AGREEMENT AND THE 
INSTITUTIONS ESTABLISHED THEREUNDER 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed how the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) were founded. These three regional integration arrangements (RIA) will be 
the building blocks of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). It was also noted that much as 
market integration was the major aim of the formation of COMESA, the aims for the formation 
of both the EAC and SADC were as a result of a blend of political, social and economic factors. 
 
The previous chapter also examined the existing membership status of these three regional 
economic communities (RECs). It was noted that among the current memberships of the three 
RECs, there are some countries that belong to more than one RIA. Furthermore, the chapter also 
highlighted the regional integration institutions (RIIs) that have been established in the three 
RECs and the panoply of functions which they perform. It was noted that in order to achieve 
their aims and objectives, all the three RECs have established institutions that are similar.
162
  
 
Having already examined the three RECs, this chapter will be aimed at discussing the TFTA 
Agreement. This chapter will recount the process that led to the negotiations and the eventual 
signing of the TFTA Agreement. It will also examine the aims and objectives of the TFTA as 
provided in the TFTA Agreement. Most significantly, this chapter will discuss the institutions 
that will be established under the TFTA Agreement and the functions which they will be 
expected to perform.  Lastly, the chapter will examine the nature of the relationship that is 
                                            
162
 The aims and objectives of each REC are also reflected in the kind of institutions that were established.  It was 
further noted that in the RECs, each institution has been vested with the necessary authority and mandate in order to 
ensure that the overall objective of that REC is achieved. 
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expected to exist between the institutions that will be established under the TFTA Agreement 
and the existing RIIs in the three RECs. 
 
 
3.2  The road towards the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA)  
 
It was noted in the previous chapter that COMESA, EAC and SADC have all adopted a similar 
linear regional integration model.
163
 In as much as the EAC envisages the ultimate attainment of 
a political federation, the attainment of free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions and common 
markets is a common feature in these three RECs. Similarly, the goals and strategies of market 
integration that have been adopted in all the three RECs tend to be indistinguishable.
164
 Of 
course, there are areas where the RECs have adopted strategies and methods that are different. 
For instance, Naumann cited the Rules of Origin and trade instruments that are applicable in the 
three RECs as not similar.
165
  
 
The similarities in the goals and strategies of the three RECs put countries with multiple REC 
memberships in a tricky situation. In addition to the financial costs of maintaining memberships 
in two RECs that have similar objectives, the countries with multiple REC memberships were 
also expected to encounter the legal impracticability of belonging to two customs unions.
166
 
Therefore, maintaining multiple REC memberships or having overlapping REC memberships 
                                            
163
 Kalenga P (2011) 4. 
 
164
 Kalenga P (2011) 4. 
 
165
 Naumann E ‘Rules of Origin in the Tripartite FTA: Reflections on the status quo and the challenges ahead’ in 
Hartzenberg T (Ed) From Cape to Cairo: Making the Tripartite Free Trade Area work (2011) 258. 
Naumann argued that the Rules of Origin in COMESA and the EAC are, to some extent, similar because they are 
generally based on a value added rule of 35 per cent for local content, whereas those in SADC are product specific 
and use a variety of means to determine eligibility.  
 
166
  It is technically not possible for a country to belong to more than one customs union because the countries in 
each union set up one common external tariff (CET) and quotas against non-members. Customs unions also require 
not only joint policies on tariffs and quotas but also harmonisation of domestic legal instruments, and collective 
governance of institutions that manage the CET.  
(See Mwanza W ‘African continental integration agenda: Suggestions for African Countries and Region’ in 
Hartzenberg T (Ed) Supporting Regional integration in East and Southern Africa: Review of select issues (2010) 56) 
available at: http://www.paulroos.co.za/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/RI_Review_Issues_Book_Final20100507.pdf (accessed 27 April 2016). 
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was being singled out as a factor inhibiting intra-Africa trade growth and the realisation of 
tangible fruits of market integration.
167
 
 
Erasmus summed up the challenges, created as a result of overlapping memberships, to 
achieving deeper market integration as follows: 
 
‘Overlapping membership results in multiple financial obligations, varying trade 
regimes, duplication of standards, waste of resources, the difficulty of belonging to 
two customs unions, and so forth. Overlapping membership also has serious 
implications for the private sector by complicating business transactions and raising 
the cost of doing business. For example, the business community have to contend 
with different trade regimes, including varying tariff levels, rules of origin and 
technical standards.’168 
  
 The above quotation has encapsulated the cost resulting from multiple or overlapping REC 
memberships on the African continent. The costs are further exacerbated by the fact that most 
countries on the continent already have political, social and economic problems that need to be 
attended to.
169
  
 
In addition, apart from being costly and inefficient in the realisation of regional integration, 
multiple REC memberships tend to confuse not only the parties involved in the RECs but also 
third parties.
170
 In support of this argument, Chikono and Nakana quoted the then SADC Deputy 
Executive Secretary, Albert Muchanga, as follows: 
                                            
167
 Akonor K  (2009) 90. 
 
168
 Erasmus G ‘Legal and institutional aspects of the Tripartite Free Trade Area: The need for effective 
implementation’ in Hartzenberg T (Ed) Tripartite Free Trade Area: Towards a new African integration paradigm 
(2012) 14. 
 
169
 Mapuva J & Mapuva L ‘The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration?’ 
Online article available at: http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2077-49072014000100002 
(accessed 27 April 2016). 
 
170
 Chingono M & Nakana S ‘The Challenges to Regional Integration’ in African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations (2009) Vol 3(10) 404. available at:  http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir (accessed 14 
April 2016). 
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‘The overlapping of mandates [of countries with multiple or overlapping 
memberships] does not only put pressure on countries to meet their obligations and 
this could also send confusing signals to donors.’[Emphasis added]171 
 
Furthermore, Hancock also added that overlapping memberships may weaken regional 
integration.
172
 This may happen in cases where the overlapping memberships lead to 
complications in policy co-ordination and facilitate confusion and lack of communication 
between countries and RECs, resulting in what Bhagwatti termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
problem.
173
 The spaghetti bowl problems are obstacles characterised by conflicting 
implementation schedules of obligations for member states, which ends up undermining the 
effectiveness of trade regimes.
174
 
 
Due to the challenges caused by multiple and overlapping REC memberships, countries that had 
that status faced a difficult choice of whether to maintain or withdraw REC memberships. As we 
noted in the previous chapter, some countries, like, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, and 
Namibia, withdrew their COMESA membership and only maintained their SADC membership. 
Other countries still maintained multiple memberships. Apparently, it proved difficult for some 
countries to make the choice of withdrawing their memberships, since they enjoyed the variety 
                                                                                                                                            
 
171
 Chingono M & Nakana S (2009) 404. 
 
172
 Hancock K J ‘What role for the EU in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU): Advocate, cajoler, or 
bully?’ A paper prepared for the Conference on the Diffusion of Regional Integration, Kellog-Forschergruppe, 
Transformative Power of Europe, Berlin (10 - 11 December 2010)  5.  
 
173
 Luwan D ‘Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa countries: Multiplicity of membership issues and 
choices’ African Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 18(2) (2010) 218 available at: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/afjincol18&div=14&g_sent=1&collection=journals 
(accessed 27 April 2016). 
  
174
 Shinyekwa I & Othieno L (2011) 7. 
 An example of inconsistent and incoherent policies can be argued against countries that are both members of 
COMESA and SADC. COMESA follows classical Vinerian thinking and stresses the benefits of integration that are 
derived after the removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers whereas SADC supports a developmental approach to 
integration that focuses on sectoral co-operation.( See. Mapuva J & Mapuva L ‘The SADC regional bloc: What 
challenges and prospects for regional integration?’ (Online article) available at: 
http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2077-49072014000100002 (accessed 27 April 2016). 
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of benefits of belonging to more than one REC.
175
  Membership of a RIA is a political choice for 
any country and depends on several considerations: political, social, geographic, strategic and 
economic, just to mention a few.
176
 Furthermore, at a diplomatic level, it was not possible to 
force countries to maintain single membership, as long as they are able to fulfil the obligations 
that arise from their status as members.
177
 
 
In addition, a decision to withdraw from a REC may require thorough consultations with 
different stakeholders in both the government and private sectors that may be affected by such 
action.
178
 Such consultations do not come cheaply. They require a lot of financial resources.
179
 
Therefore, some countries found it hard to withdraw memberships in RECs, and instead 
maintained dual memberships. 
 
In light of the failure to decisively resolve the issue of multiple and overlapping REC 
memberships, there were proposals to establish a new legal arrangement that would consolidate 
the three RECs into one FTA, the TFTA.
180
 Rationalisation or consolidation of the three RECs 
into the TFTA was therefore seen as a framework that had the potential of unlocking the full 
                                            
175
 Kalenga P (2011) 4.  
 
176
 Kritzinger-van Nierken L ‘Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of 
Experience’ Discussion paper (2005) 4 available at:  http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-
concepts_May2005.pdf (accessed 14 April 2016). 
 
 
177
 Countries are also afraid of withdrawing from RIAs because of the fear of the diplomatic isolation that they may 
possibly face as a result of such a decision, especially from countries that are left in the REC. 
 (See. Shinyekwa I & Othieno L (2011) 7). 
  
178
  Luwan D  (2010) 232. 
 
In fact, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) concluded that the debate on the merits and 
demerits of membership of a REC has been inconclusive, even in countries where national studies have been carried 
out, such as Malawi. Member countries themselves see merit in belonging to more than one RIA.  
(See Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Progress and Prospects in the Implementation of Protocols in 
Southern Africa  (2011)  42 available at: 
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/15508/bib.%2062082.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 14 April 
2016)).  
 
179
 Luwan D  (2010) 232. 
 
180
 Kalenga P (2011) 4. 
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potential of intra-African trade.
181
  Shinyekwa and Othieno have argued that the TFTA market 
would not only have the effect of realising positive economic growth for countries in the region 
but also of opening up markets for their commodities.
182
 They added that economic advantage of 
one consolidated FTA in eastern and southern Africa was expected to be greater than the total 
economic advantage of maintaining the separate RECs. It should also be noted that, parallel to 
the TFTA initiative, there is another regional integration initiative under the auspices of the 
African Union (AU) to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by the year 2017, 
covering all African countries.
183
 
 
The first meeting to discuss the possibility of establishing an FTA among COMESA, EAC and 
SADC was held in 2008, in Kampala, Uganda.
184
 In addition to endorsing the idea to establish 
the TFTA, the meeting directed the three RECs’ secretariats to jointly undertake a study 
exploring the best possible way of establishing an FTA among the three RECs.
185
  
 
The second tripartite meeting between COMESA, EAC and SADC was held in July 2011 in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. This meeting launched the negotiations towards the formation of the 
TFTA. The meeting further agreed that the proposed TFTA should be anchored on the following 
                                            
181
 Mwanza W (2010) 51. 
 
182
 Shinyekwa I & Othieno L (2011) 7. 
 
183
 The negotiations towards the formation of the CFTA were supposed to be launched in 2015 but have delayed due 
to the delays in the TFTA negotiations.  
 
For further reading on the CFTA see: African Union (AU)  ‘Update on the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA)’ 
available 
at:http://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Continental_FTA/Update%20on%20the%20Continental%20Free%20Tr
ade.pdf (accessed 22 May 2016). 
 
184
 The meeting was attended to by Heads of State and Government representing all the countries that have 
membership in any of the three RECs. The meeting concluded that the proposed tripartite arrangement would be a 
crucial building block towards the achievement of the African Economic Community (AEC) as outlined by the AEC 
Treaty. 
 
185
 Final Communiqué of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government, 
Kampala, Uganda (22 October 2008) para. 13 available at: https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/COMESA-EAC-
SADC_EN_221008.pdf (accessed 15 April 2016). 
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three pillars: (a) market integration; (b) infrastructure development; and (c) industrial 
development.
186
 
 
Finally, the Heads of State and Government representing a total of 26 countries in COMESA, 
EAC and SADC signed the TFTA Declaration and the TFTA Agreement in June 2015, at Sharm 
el-sheikh, Egypt.
187
  By May 2016, a total of 16 countries had signed the TFTA Agreement: 
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, 
Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
188
 
However, at that time, no country had ratified the TFTA Agreement.
189
  The TFTA Agreement 
will require 14 ratifications for it to come into force.
190
 
 
 
3.3  The Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement  
 
The TFTA Agreement aims at establishing a single market within the territories covered by 
COMESA, EAC and SADC countries. It is estimated that the TFTA market (excluding South 
Sudan), potentially, has a population of 632 million people, representing 57 per cent of the whole 
population on the continent of Africa.
191
  The TFTA will also boast of a total Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of US$ 1.3 trillion, representing 58 per cent of Africa’s GDP.192  
                                            
186
 Communiqué of the Second COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit, Vision: Towards a Single Market, 
Theme: Deepening COMESA-EAC-SADC Integration, 12 June 2011 available at: 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2011/comesa0613a.html (accessed 15 April 2016). 
 
187
 Eritrea and Libya were the only countries that did not sign the TFTA Declaration in June 2015. It should also be 
noted that South Sudan had not yet at this moment acceded to the EAC Treaty. 
 
188
 Erasmus G ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement: Results of Phase One of the Negotiations’ (2015) 8 
available at: http://www.tralac.org/images/docs/7803/us15wp042015-erasmus-tripartite-fta-results-of-phase-one-of-
the-negotiations-20150729-fin.pdf  (accessed 15 April 2016).  
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 Business reporter ‘Countries delay TFTA ratification’ The Herald Newspaper 8 March 2016 available at: 
http://www.herald.co.zw/countries-delay-tfta-ratification/ (accessed 15 April 2016). 
 
190
 Art. 39 (3) of the TFTA Agreement.  
 
191
 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit  para. (1) (b)  2. 
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 Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit  para. (1) (b)  2. 
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The benefits of establishing a large market on a continent which is characterised by small and 
fragmented national markets can hardly be over-emphasised. Shayanowako argued that the 
TFTA market may help bolster intra-regional trade through: (a) increased market access for 
products; (b) increased economic growth; (c) increased foreign direct investment (FDI) flow; (d) 
elimination of some challenges associated with overlapping memberships;
193
 (e) increased 
industrialisation; (f) improved competitiveness of products; (g) exploitation of untapped 
resources; and (h) development of good infrastructure.
194
  
 
In addition, the establishment of the TFTA is also being seen as an important step in the 
realisation of the vision of the AU of establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) as 
enshrined in the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, the AEC Treaty of 1991 and the Resolution of the 
AU Summit
195
 held in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006.
196
 
 
As stated earlier, the TFTA integration process will be based on a developmental approach 
anchored on three pillars of: (a) market integration as symbolised by the large FTA; (b) 
infrastructure development to facilitate and enhance connectivity, communication, and 
movement of goods and persons, and reduce the cost of doing business; and (c) industrialisation 
which will enhance competitiveness of firms and address the supply and productive capacity 
constraints.
197
 
 
Art.2 of the TFTA Agreement provides for the establishment of an FTA among the countries that 
are members of COMESA, EAC and SADC. The range of matters that will be covered under the 
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 See the Preamble to the TFTA Agreement. 
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 Shayanowako P ‘Towards a COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area’ Trade and Development 
Studies Issue No. 40 (2011) 9-12 available at: 
http://www.panafricanglobaltradeconference.com/upload/towards_a_tripartite_free_trade_area_.pdf (accessed 19 
April 2016). 
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 The AU Summit in Gambia directed the AU Commission and RECs to harmonise and co-ordinate policies and 
programmes of RECs as important strategies for rationalisation, and increasing intra-Africa trade and investment 
and integration of African economies in the global economy. 
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TFTA Agreement includes: (a) trade in goods; (b) trade in services; and (c) other trade related 
matters.
198
 Art.4 of the TFTA Agreement provides for the general objectives of the TFTA. The 
general objectives of the TFTA include: (a) to promote economic and social development of the 
TFTA region; (b) to create a large single market with free movement of goods and services to 
promote intra-regional trade; (c) to enhance the regional and continental integration processes; 
and (d) to build a strong FTA for the benefit of its people.  
 
Art.5 (e) of the TFTA Agreement provides that the TFTA Agreement shall establish and 
maintain an institutional framework for the implementation and administration of the TFTA. 
These TFTA institutions are established under Art. 29 of the TFTA Agreement, and will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
 
Art.6 of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for the general principles that will govern the 
TFTA. These principles include the following: (a) TFTA being REC or member state driven;
199
 
(b) variable geometry;
200
 (c) building on the acquis;
201
 (d) consensus decision making;
202
 (e) 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment;
203
 (f) National Treatment;
204
 and (g) best practices in 
the TFTA. 
                                            
198
 Art.3 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
199
 The individual member or partner states will be parties to the TFTA and not the RECs. The TFTA Agreement 
makes no provision for a secretariat as the three REC secretariats will be its custodians.  
 
200
 The principle would enable groups of countries wishing to pursue a given goal to do so, while allowing those 
opposed to it to hold back. It also allows for the co-existence of countries in different trading arrangements with 
small integrating effects. 
 
201
 The TFTA will build on the successes already achieved by the RECs through trade liberalisation. 
 
202
 Decision making in its institutions will be made by consensus of the members. 
 
203
 The principle of MFN Treatment simply means treating other countries equally. Under the WTO agreements, 
countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Granting special favours (such as a lower 
customs duty rate for one of their products) has to done for all other WTO members. The principle of MFN 
Treatment is so important that it is the Art. 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
governs trade in goods. The principle of MFN Treatment is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) (Art. 2) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) (Art. 4) Therefore, under the TFTA Agreement a member of the TFTA will be under an obligation to 
accord MFN Treatment to another member. (See. This definition of MFN Treatment is available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#seebox (accessed 27 April 2016). 
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Part II of the TFTA Agreement provides for the principle of non-discrimination. Articles 7 and 8 
of the TFTA Agreement provides for the principles of Most Favoured Nation Treatment and 
National Treatment, respectively. 
 
Part III of the TFTA Agreement governs the liberalisation of goods. This includes matters to do 
with: (a) elimination of import duties;
205
 (b) non-tariff barriers;
206
 (c) rules of origin;
207
 and (d) 
elimination of quantitative restrictions.
208
 
 
Part IV of the TFTA Agreement deals with issues of customs co-operation and trade 
facilitation.
209
 In addition, Art. 15 also makes provision for goods that are in transit from one 
country to another in the TFTA. 
 
Part V of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for trade remedies and other related matters. It 
provides for, among other things: (a) transitional matters; (b) anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures; (c) safeguard measures; (d) preferential safeguards; and (e) co-operation on trade 
remedies.
210
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
204
  National Treatment means treating foreigners and locals equally. Imported and locally produced goods should be 
treated equally — at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. The same should apply to foreign and 
domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and patents. This principle of National Treatment 
(giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals) is also found in all the three main WTO agreements (Art. 
3 of GATT, Art. 17 of GATS and Art. 3 of TRIPS) Therefore, under the TFTA Agreement a Tripartite 
Member/Partner State will be expected to accord to products imported from other Tripartite Member/Partner States 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like domestic products. (See The definition of National Treatment 
available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#seebox (accessed 27 April 2016). 
 
205
 Art.9 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
206
 Art.10 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
207
 Art.12 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
208
 Art.11of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
209
 Arts.13 and 14 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
210
 Arts.16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively, of the TFTA Agreement. 
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Part VI of the TFTA Agreement provides for other trade related matters, such as, technical 
barriers to trade,
211
 sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
212
 special economic zones,
213
 and infant 
industries.
214
 Part VII of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for co-operation in matters of 
finance,
215
 trade policies,
216
 and research and statistics.
217
 
 
Parts VIII and IX of the TFTA Agreement make provision for the establishment of TFTA 
institutions and a dispute settlement mechanism, respectively.
218
 These provisions will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter when considering the TFTA institutions and their 
functions. 
 
Parts X and XI of the TFTA Agreement make provision for general and security exceptions
219
 
and financial provisions.
220
 It should be noted that the member/partner states are yet to determine 
the modalities of how they will fund their commitments towards the implementation of the 
TFTA.
221
 
 
Lastly, Part XII of the TFTA Agreement deals with general and final provisions. These matters 
include: (a) working languages;
222
 (b) amendments;
223
 (c) sanctions;
224
 (d) accession;
225
 (e) 
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 Art.21 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
212
 Art.22 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
213
 Art.23 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
214
 Art.24 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
215
 Art. 26 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
216
 Art.27 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
217
 Art.28 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
218
 Arts.29 and 30, respectively, of the TFTA Agreement. 
  
219
 Arts.31 and 32 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
220
 Art.34 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
221
 Art.34 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
222
 Art. 35 of the TFTA Agreement. 
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withdrawal;
226
 (f) depositary and registration;
227
 (g) negotiation of issues that were still 
outstanding from Phase I;
228
 (h) Phase II negotiations;
229
 and (i) the signatures part.
230
 
 
 
3.4 The institutions to be established under the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
(TFTA) Agreement and their functions  
 
The TFTA institutional framework is provided for under Parts VIII and IX of the TFTA 
Agreement. These institutions will be established so that they aid in achieving the objectives of 
the TFTA, as enshrined in the TFTA Agreement. Furthermore, the institutions will also be vested 
with the necessary authority to carry out their respective mandates. It should be mentioned that 
Annex X, which will provide for how the Dispute Settlement Mechanism will operate, is yet to 
be agreed upon.
231
 
 
Art.29 (1) of the TFTA Agreement will establish seven institutions or organs for the 
implementation of the TFTA. These institutions are: (a) the Tripartite Summit; (b) the Tripartite 
Council of Ministers; (c) the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Trade, Finance, 
Customs and Economic Matters, and Home/Internal Affairs; (d) the Tripartite Ministerial 
Committee on Legal Affairs; (e) the Tripartite Task Force of the Secretariats of the three RECs; 
(f) the Tripartite Committee of Senior officials; and (g) the Tripartite Committee of Experts. 
                                                                                                                                            
223
 Art. 37 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
224
 Art. 38 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
225
 Art. 41 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
226
 Art.42 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
227
 Art.43 of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
228
 Art.44 of the TFTA Agreement. 
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 Art.45 of the TFTA Agreement. 
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 Pgs.21 and 22 of the TFTA Agreement. 
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 Art.30 (e) of the TFTA Agreement. 
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First, the Tripartite Summit will consist of the Heads of State and Government representing the 
countries that will ratify the TFTA Agreement. The major function of the Tripartite Summit will 
be to provide the general directions and impetus for the Tripartite arrangement.
232
 This mini 
thesis observes that the composition and the function of the Tripartite Summit are similar to 
those of the Authority in COMESA; the Summit in the EAC; and the Summit of Heads of State 
and Government in SADC. 
 
Secondly, the Tripartite Council of Ministers will consist of Ministers designated by the 
Tripartite member/partner states to act on matters relating to the TFTA.
233
 Similarly, this mini 
thesis notes that the composition and function of the Tripartite Council of Ministers mirrors those 
of the Council in COMESA; the Council in the EAC; and the Council of Ministers in SADC. 
 
Thirdly, Art.29 (1) (c) of the TFTA Agreement provides for two types of Ministerial 
Committees. One is the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Trade, Finance, Customs 
and Economic Matters, and Home Affairs. The function of this Committee will be to deal with 
policy direction and implementation of matters to do with trade, finance, customs, home affairs 
and other related sectoral matters. The other is the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on 
Legal Affairs. The function of this Committee is to deal with policy direction and 
implementation of legal matters in the TFTA. This mini thesis observes that, to some extent, the 
composition and functions of the two Ministerial Committees provided for under Art. 29 (1) (c) 
of the TFTA Agreement, are a reflection of those of, both the Council and the Committee of 
Governors of Central Banks in COMESA; the Council in the EAC; and the Sectoral and Cluster 
Ministerial Committees in SADC. 
 
Fourthly, Art.29 (1) (d) of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for the Tripartite Task Force of 
the Secretariats of the three RECs. The function of this institution is to act as a secretariat to the 
TFTA arrangement. This Task Force will also co-ordinate the implementation of the Tripartite 
work programme. This institution is the one that co-ordinated all the efforts in the negotiation of 
                                            
232
 Art.29 (1) (a) of the TFTA Agreement. 
 
233
 Art.29 (1) (b) of the TFTA Agreement. 
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the TFTA Agreement.
234
 In as much as the TFTA Agreement has not made a provision for a 
fully-fledged secretariat to service it, it can be argued that this institution will act as a secretariat. 
The Tripartite Task Force will be the custodian of the TFTA arrangement. Therefore, it will be 
the defacto TFTA secretariat. In as much as there is no provision for a functional secretariat 
under the TFTA Agreement, this mini thesis argues that the secretarial role of this particular 
institution reflects those roles being carried out by the respective secretariats of COMESA, EAC 
and SADC. 
 
Fifthly, Art.29 (1) (e) of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for the establishment and 
function of the Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials. This Committee will be responsible for 
overseeing and guiding technical work. This mini thesis also observes that the composition and 
functions of the Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials reflect those of the Inter-governmental 
Committee in COMESA; the Co-ordination Committee in the EAC; and the Standing Committee 
of Officials in SADC. 
 
Sixthly, Art.29 (1) (f) of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for the establishment and the 
function of the Tripartite Committee of Experts. The Committee of Experts will be responsible 
for carrying out of the technical work in the TFTA and will be reporting to the Tripartite 
Committee of Senior Officials. This mini thesis further observes that the composition and 
functions of the Tripartite Committee of Experts replicate those of the sectoral technical 
committees in COMESA; and sectoral committees in the EAC. 
 
Lastly, Art.30 of the TFTA Agreement makes provision for the establishment of a Tripartite 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The DSB will be responsible for the administration of the rules 
of procedure and the settlement of disputes under the TFTA arrangement. The DSB will also 
have the functions and powers to interpret and apply the TFTA Agreement, in addition to the 
resolution of any disputes between Tripartite member or partner states.
235
 The DSB is modelled 
on WTO thinking and its panels will consist of TFTA member/partner states.
236
  The DSB will 
                                            
234
 Final Communiqué of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit (2008)  para 13. 
235
 Art.30 (4) & (5) of the TFTA Agreement. 
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 Erasmus G (2015) 11. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 49  
 
therefore be empowered to establish its own panel and an Appellate Body when conducting its 
operations.
237
 The rules of procedure of the DSB are yet to be provided for in the TFTA 
Agreement.  
 
Just as has been submitted regarding the Tripartite institutions to be established under Art. 29 of 
the TFTA Agreement, similarly for the DSB, dispute settlement mechanisms are a common 
feature in all the three RECs. In as much as at the moment the exact nature of the DSB is not 
clear, this mini thesis argues that its major function will be similar to that of the Court of Justice 
in COMESA; the Court of Justice in the EAC; and the Tribunal in SADC. The major function of 
these four dispute settlement mechanisms is to interpret and apply the legal instruments by which 
they were established. 
 
Having noted the striking similarities between the institutions established under the TFTA 
Agreement and those that exist in the RECs, the next paragraphs will examine the nature of the 
relationship that is expected to exist between these sets of institutions. It will provide an analysis 
of the relationship expected to exist between the TFTA institutions and the REC institutions. 
Understanding this relationship will be important in light of some parts of the discussion in the 
last two chapters of this mini thesis.  
 
 
3.5 The relationship between the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) institutions 
and the existing institutions in the three regional economic communities 
(RECs) 
 
It should be noted in the first place that the TFTA Agreement does not offer clear guidance on 
how the TFTA institutions and the existing REC institutions will operate. In light of this, this 
mini thesis will discuss the probable nature of the relationship between institutions in these two 
regimes. 
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The nature of the relationship between the institutions that will be established under the TFTA 
Agreement and the existing REC institutions may be categorised into two types, depending on 
the perspective from which one looks at them. The relationship between the two regimes may 
differ according to: (a) the relationship between the institutions of the two regimes as governed 
by the TFTA Agreement itself or principles governing international trade; and (b) the 
relationship of the institutions of the two regimes as governed by public international law 
principles.  
 
On the one hand, the TFTA Agreement and principles of international trade law appear to 
suggest that the relationship between the institutions of the TFTA arrangement and the existing 
institutions in the three RECs is not on a par but at different levels, with the former being 
superior to the latter. It has already been noted that the TFTA Agreement will not establish a new 
REC.
238
 The text of Art. 2 of the TFTA Agreement merely intends to establish an FTA among 
the member or partner states of COMESA, EAC and SADC and not a new legal personality.
239
 
The TFTA Agreement will only serve to accommodate the separate existence of the legal and 
institutional arrangements of the three RECs.
240
  In contrast, the three RECs have all been 
established under their respective treaties as legal entities with rights and obligations under 
international law. For instance, Art.4 of the EAC Treaty clearly states that the EAC shall be a 
body corporate with legal capacity as a person.
241
  Similar provisions exist in Art.186 of the 
COMESA Treaty and Art.3 of the SADC Treaty. The TFTA Agreement is silent on the 
establishment of the TFTA as a legal personality. Therefore, this mini thesis argues that the 
                                            
238
 Erasmus G (2015) 2.  
 
239
 The legal status of the TFTA is not clear from the text of the TFTA Agreement. It remains to be seen whether the 
TFTA institutions will have legal personality, with rights and obligations, under international law or it will have 
personality through the RECs or the members/partners. The TFTA Agreement is silent on its legal status. 
 
240
 Erasmus G (2015) 2.  
 
241
 The EAC establishment formula is similarly used in the other two RECs. The establishment of the RECs as legal 
personalities allows them to have legal capacity to make transactions on their own as independent bodies, separated 
from their member countries. In the absence of a similar establishment formula under the TFTA Agreement, it 
therefore remains to be seen how the institutions of the TFTA will transact their business and whether they will be 
capable of suing or being sued or the TFTA will operate through the TFTA members/partner states. 
(Compare  with: Art. 186 of the COMESA Treaty and Art. 3 of the SADC Treaty). 
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TFTA Agreement may not establish the TFTA as an entity that will be of similar nature to the 
existing RECs. The TFTA will be different. 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the original TFTA idea was to establish one FTA in the 
region with legal personality and typical institutions of a REC, but this was subsequently 
dropped.
242
 It has also been stated that the negotiators of the TFTA Agreement were conscious of 
the need to avoid creating another REC, and this influenced the choice of the legal instrument 
that was ultimately used to establish the TFTA.
243
 In supporting the choice of instrument 
submission, Mangeni and Muzorori have argued that the choice of a legal instrument depends on 
practice and intention.
244
 They stated that it is a practice in international law that treaties tend to 
deal with grave matters like cessation of hostilities or the establishment of new institutional 
orders and are multi-sectoral like REC treaties, whereas agreements tend to deal with specific 
sectoral matters, like trade matters, etc.
245
 They cited examples like the agreements establishing 
the WTO, on one hand, and treaties establishing COMESA, EAC and SADC on the other hand. 
The two authors concluded that the agreement nomenclature may have been chosen by the TFTA 
negotiators on the basis of common usage in international trade, and also that it will constitute 
binding rights and obligations within a specific area of law, in this case, trade.
246
   
 
This mini thesis therefore argues that by their choice of an agreement, as opposed to a treaty, in 
establishing the TFTA, the drafters of the TFTA Agreement intended the TFTA to have a status 
that is different from those of the three RECs. It was noted in the earlier chapters that the all the 
                                            
242
 Erasmus G (2015) 2.  
The idea to establish one FTA may have been dropped because the RECs deal with a wide range of issues apart from 
market integration, so it would not have been possible to dissolve the RECs altogether in order to form the TFTA. 
 
243Mangeni F & Muzorori T ‘Tripartite Text Based FTA Negotiation’ in Ngwenya S (Ed) Key Issues in Regional 
Integration Vol 2 (2013) 98  available at: 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/1223/Key%20Issues%20on%20Regional%20Intergration.pdf.) 
(accessed 21 April 2016). 
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The law governing international treaties is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties,1969. 
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three RECs were established through treaties, whereas the TFTA will be established through an 
agreement. Hence, the two regimes cannot be on a par.  
 
To extend the above submission, this mini thesis further argues that the TFTA Agreement 
appears to be more of a multilateral trading agreement than a bilateral trading agreement.
247
 
Therefore, the TFTA Agreement may not be on a par with REC treaties, which are commonly 
regarded as bilateral trading agreements.
248
 It has been noted that multilateral institutions, like 
the WTO, were established by agreements whereas bilateral institutions, like the RECs, are 
usually established under treaties.
249
 Since the TFTA Agreement will be regarded as a 
multilateral agreement, whereas the REC treaties are currently regarded as bilateral agreements, 
it can be submitted that TFTA will be higher in the hierarchy than the existing RECs. Just as the 
WTO level is, arguably, higher than the REC level, this mini thesis similarly submits that the 
TFTA level will be higher than the REC level.  Arguably, the TFTA will be at a level that is 
below the WTO.
250
  
 
 In addition, Art.30 (7) of the TFTA Agreement provides that in the event of any inconsistency 
or conflict between the TFTA Agreement and the treaties and instruments of COMESA, EAC 
and SADC, the TFTA Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict. This 
provision therefore buttresses the submission that the TFTA Agreement may be at a level which 
is superior to the levels of the three REC treaties. Therefore, this mini thesis submits that the 
                                            
247
 This conclusion can be deduced from the arguments made by the framers of the TFTA Agreement who wanted to 
follow the WTO model of instrument as opposed to the REC model of a treaty. 
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international trade and promote the reduction in barriers to trade. 
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jurisdiction of the institutions established by the TFTA Agreement may be superior to those 
existing institutions in the three RECs. 
 
On the other hand, this mini thesis will also argue that principles governing public international 
law appear to suggest that the relationship between the institutions of the TFTA arrangement and 
those institutions in the RECs may be on a par. Therefore no regime will be superior to the other. 
 
 This argument is made on the basis that it will be individual countries, and not RECs, that will 
be parties to the TFTA Agreement. The preamble to the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 
1969 (VCLT), a legal instrument that governs international agreements and conventions in 
international law, recognises the doctrine of equality of states. The doctrine of equality of states 
provides that all states are equal at international law.
251
  The VCLT further provides that 
countries that are parties to an international agreement derive equal rights and obligations from 
it. The TFTA Agreement is an international legal instrument, just like the three treaties that 
established COMESA, EAC and SADC. Since it has already been observed that the mandates 
and institutions of the two regimes are similar, therefore most of the rights and obligations 
arising from the two regimes will be identical and similar in nature. Hence, Tripartite 
member/partner states will derive equal rights and obligations as a result of being parties to both 
the TFTA Agreement and the RECs treaties. No regime rights or obligations will outweigh the 
other. This mini thesis therefore submits that the TFTA arrangement and the RECs may be on a 
par with each other.  
 
From the above analysis of the relationship between the TFTA arrangement and the RECs 
regime, this mini thesis concludes that the exact nature of this relationship is not clearly defined. 
Apart from Art.30 (7) of the TFTA Agreement which deals with the resolution of inconsistencies 
or conflicts between the TFTA regime and the individual RECs regime, the TFTA Agreement is 
silent on how these two legal regimes will interact in practice. The TFTA Agreement has not 
provided guiding principles that will govern instances where there are substantial overlaps in the 
                                            
251
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obligations of the two regimes. What can be seen are two legal regimes which are, in one breath, 
arguably, on a par or have parallel jurisdiction; and, in another breath, that the legal regime of the 
TFTA is a bit higher than those of the RECs. 
The lack of clarity on the nature of the relationship between the TFTA regime and the REC 
regimes may cause confusion and therefore create uncertainty.
252
 These scenarios may, as it will 
be observed in the next chapter, hinder the aims and objectives of the TFTA itself.  This is so 
because the situation may create an environment where member or partner states may have the 
liberty to choose which regime should be applicable in a particular case, otherwise called forum 
shopping.
253
 The multiplicity of the parallel TFTA and REC regimes that have similar 
institutions and obligations may exacerbate the uncertainty in countries that have multiple REC 
memberships leading to incidents of forum shopping.
254
 As it will be observed in the next 
chapter, this state of affairs may add to the problems that may be encountered by countries that 
have multiple REC memberships. 
 
 
3.6  Conclusion  
 
This chapter has discussed the background to the establishment of the TFTA. It has discussed 
that the TFTA Agreement is not aimed at creating a new REC, but to harmonise and consolidate 
the existing RECs’ agreements and regimes in order to not only help reduce trade barriers by 
establishing one single economic trading space, but also reduce the challenges caused by 
multiple REC memberships. It has also been noted that the TFTA arrangement is also aimed at 
contributing towards the broader AU objectives, as enshrined in the LPA of 1980 and the Abuja 
Treaty to establish the AEC by 2028. 
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This chapter has further highlighted the important provisions of the TFTA Agreement. It has also 
considered the institutions which the TFTA Agreement will establish and how these institutions 
and their functions mirror the existing institutions in COMESA, EAC and SADC. Finally, the 
chapter has demonstrated the nature of the relationship that may likely exist between the TFTA 
institutions and the REC institutions.  
 
Having discussed the REC and TFTA institutions, the next chapter will discuss the repercussions 
of the establishment of the TFTA institutions on the countries that have multiple REC 
memberships. The discussion will be undertaken against the background that the TFTA 
arrangement itself is aimed at addressing and resolving the challenges of multiple and 
overlapping memberships in COMESA, the EAC and SADC.
255
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE AREA INSTITUTIONS AND ITS 
REPERCUSSIONS ON COUNTRIES WITH MULTIPLE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIPS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) initiative. It was 
discussed that the TFTA is aimed at rationalising and consolidating the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) regional economic communities (RECs) into one 
single trade regime in order to overcome the problems that exist as a result of multiple and 
overlapping REC memberships. Multiple and overlapping REC memberships have been 
regarded as one of the factors that has inhibited the potential for intra-regional trade in Africa.
256
  
 
The previous chapter also discussed the provisions of the TFTA Agreement, highlighting some 
of its salient provisions. The chapter also discussed the institutions that will be established by the 
TFTA Agreement and the functions which they will be expected to perform.
257
 The chapter 
further demonstrated how these TFTA institutions replicate the institutions that already exist in 
the three RECs, in terms of both composition and function. 
 
Finally, the chapter analysed the probable nature of the relationship that may exist between, on 
the one hand, the TFTA institutions and, on the other hand, the RECs’ institutions. In the 
analysis, it was noted that the TFTA Agreement does not provide any guiding principles on how 
the TFTA institutions will interact with the RECs’ institutions. However, it was demonstrated 
how under the principles of international law, the institutions of the two regimes may be 
regarded as being on a par with each other. It was also demonstrated how under the norms that 
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govern international trade, supported by a construction of Art.30 (7) of the TFTA Agreement, the 
relationship between the two regimes may suggest that the TFTA institutions will be superior to 
those of the RECs. This lack of certainty about this relationship may leave a lot of room for 
forum shopping by member states. Forum shopping among the TFTA member/partner states may 
in the long run undermine the efficacy of the TFTA regime.  
 
From the discussions in the previous chapters, this mini thesis intends to make two assumptions. 
These assumptions will provide the basis of the discussion later in this chapter.  
 
The first assumption is that since the TFTA Agreement will not dissolve and merge the three 
RECs into one, single regime, but will only rationalise and consolidate them into a single FTA, 
multiple and overlapping REC memberships will continue to exist, even after the establishment 
of the TFTA. This is because the separate legal and institutional arrangements in the three RECs 
will remain intact. The REC memberships will not be altered or affected by the TFTA 
Agreement. The TFTA arrangement will arguably only serve the purpose of accommodating the 
separate existence of these three RECs.
258
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The second assumption is that although the TFTA Agreement may not establish a new ‘REC’, 
the fact that it will still establish new regional integration institutions (RIIs) that have similar 
composition and function to those existing RIIs in the three RECs, implies that the TFTA will 
bring in additional obligations to Tripartite member/partner states. Consequently, the obligations 
of Tripartite member/partner states under the TFTA Agreement may be similar to the obligations 
that the same member/partner states already have under their respective RECs. Therefore, TFTA 
institutions will bring in new and fresh obligations for countries that ratify the TFTA Agreement. 
 
With the above assumptions, this chapter will therefore discuss the repercussions of the 
establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement on countries that have multiple REC 
memberships. Generally, the chapter will discuss the negative consequences from the TFTA 
Agreement for countries with multiple REC memberships. 
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4.2 The establishment of TFTA institutions and its repercussions on countries with 
multiple REC memberships 
 
As much as the establishment of the TFTA has been touted as being a plan for expediting the 
continent wide integration process as outlined by the African Economic Community (AEC) 
Treaty (Abuja Treaty), it has been suggested, elsewhere, that the establishment of institutions 
under the TFTA may be contrary to the AEC original plan under the Abuja Treaty.
259
 It has been 
argued that the Abuja Treaty does not envisage the establishment of new RIIs, but it focuses on 
strengthening the capacities of the existing institutions in the eight RECs that have already been 
identified therein.
260
 But as it has been noted, the TFTA Agreement appears to establish new 
RIIs, instead of strengthening the existing institutions in the three RECs. 
 
This mini thesis therefore submits that the establishment of TFTA institutions may undermine 
the first three stages towards the formation of the AEC, as outlined in the Abuja Treaty.
261
 Due 
to the establishment of TFTA institutions, the regional integration agenda on the African 
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continent will in some way be negatively affected. Generally, the establishment of TFTA 
institutions may put a strain on the already scarce financial and human resources available on the 
continent.
262
 Furthermore, the TFTA institutions may make countries lose their focus from the 
actual enhancement of regional integration and strengthening of existing REC institutions, and 
instead concentrate on establishing and maintaining the new TFTA institutions.
263
 Of all the 
countries that will ratify the TFTA Agreement, it may be the countries that have multiple REC 
memberships that may probably be affected most.  
 
The mini thesis will submit that establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement may 
have the following repercussions on countries that have multiple REC memberships. First, 
countries with multiple REC memberships may experience more financial costs as a result of the 
added operations of the TFTA institutions, when compared with those that have single REC 
memberships. Secondly, there may also be a likely increase in human resource costs for these 
countries as they try to attend meetings of both TFTA and multiple REC institutions. Thirdly, for 
countries with multiple REC memberships there may also be a possible increase in non-financial 
obligations arising from their multiple treaty memberships. These are obligations that arise when 
a country becomes a party to an international treaty.
264
 Fourthly, the lack of clarity in the nature 
of the relationship between the TFTA and REC institutions will also negatively impact on 
countries with multiple REC memberships, as it may lead to possible incidents of forum 
shopping, which may eventually scare potential investors. Lastly, there is also a probability that 
countries with multiple REC memberships may reap few trade related gains from the TFTA, 
when compared with those that have single memberships. 
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4.2.1. Multiplication of financial costs 
 
Generally, the establishment of TFTA institutions may translate into added financial obligations 
for all members that will ratify the TFTA Agreement, as it will entail additional financial 
obligations on top of those already subsisting under their respective RECs.
265
 However, it is 
those countries that have existing multiple financial obligations through their multiple REC 
memberships that will be affected most. The countries that have multiple REC memberships will 
be affected most because of the direct and indirect costs associated with the operations of the 
TFTA institutions, among others. The TFTA institutions will therefore be more burdensome on 
the taxpayers in the countries that have multiple REC memberships, when compared with those 
in countries that have single membership.
266
 
 
It should be noted that under the TFTA Agreement, the funding modalities of the TFTA initiative 
have not yet been provided for.  Art. 34 of the TFTA Agreement only states that the Tripartite 
member/partner states shall institute appropriate modalities to fund their commitments to the 
implementation of the TFTA. In the absence of clear funding modalities under the TFTA 
Agreement, this mini thesis will make assumptions on the probable sources of funding for the 
operationalisation of the TFTA. It is more likely that the TFTA arrangement, just like those of 
the RECs, will operate using funds that will come from two major sources.  
 
One probable source of funds for the functioning of the TFTA may be direct or indirect TFTA 
member/partner states’ contributions. Direct member/partner state contributions will probably be 
made to the TFTA institutions through annual contributions or membership fees. Currently, in all 
the three RECs, members or partners make financial contributions towards the operations of the 
RECs institutions, including secretariats.
267
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Indirect members/partner states contributions towards the functioning of the TFTA institutions 
will probably be made to the TFTA through the functioning and mandates of the respective REC 
secretariats in the Tripartite Task Force. The three REC secretariats have already undertaken 
some TFTA work during the negotiations phase of the TFTA Agreement.
268
 The Tripartite Task 
Force will be expected to continue its work after the coming into operation of the TFTA 
Agreement in their role of providing secretarial services to the TFTA. Since the REC secretariats 
receive funding from member/partners states in their respective RECs, the same states will by so 
doing be making indirect financial contributions towards the TFTA. 
 
The other probable source of funds for the functioning of the TFTA and its institutions will be 
from donor partners or development partners.
269
 This is also the case in all the three RECs, as 
they are all heavily reliant on donor funds.
270
 For instance, in SADC, in 2016, it was reported 
that external funding from International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) was projected at 61 per cent 
of the whole SADC annual budget.
271
 In 1999, SADC’s ICP contributions rose to as high as 80 
per cent of the annual budget.
272
  
 
In order to buttress the submission on the reliance of both member country contributions and 
donor funds in the operations of the three RECs, this mini thesis will consider the recent budgets 
of the three RECs. 
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First, in COMESA, the approved budget for the year 2015 was pegged at US$ 64.4 million.
273
 
COMESA also reported that this amount was to be raised from member’s contributions and 
donor partners. 
 
Secondly, in the EAC, the approved budget for the year 2015-2016 was estimated at 
approximately US$ 110.66 million.
274
 The contributions towards the budget were estimated as 
follows: (a) Partner states’ contributions were pegged at US$ 47.566 million; (b) Development 
partner’s contributions were pegged at US$ 58.556 million; and (c) other sources were pegged at 
US$ 4.537million.
275
 
 
Lastly, the position in SADC is not any different from the other two RECs.  SADC approved 
budget for the year 2014-15 was estimated at US$ 88.334 million.
276
 The contributions estimates 
were as follows: (a) US$ 33.675 million as member states’ contribution representing 38 per cent; 
(b) US$ 54.204 million from ICPs representing 61 per cent; and (c) US$ 0.460 million from the 
RISDP Contingency Fund, the sale of assets and interest from the bank deposits representing one 
per cent.
277
 
 
From the above financial information regarding the three RECs, it is submitted that it may be 
more likely that the sources of funds for the implementation of the TFTA and operationalisation 
of its institutions may still be the member/partner states contributions, either directly or 
                                            
273
 COMESA Secretariat ‘COMESA has mobilized $8.8m from member states” (online article) available at: 
http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1394:comesa-has-mobilized-88m-from-
member-states&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41 (accessed 9 May 2016). 
 
274
 EAC Secretariat ‘About EAC –Quick Facts’  available at: http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-quick-facts- (accessed 9 
May 2016). 
 
275
 EAC Secretariat ‘About EAC –Quick Facts’ available at: http://www.eac.int/about/EAC-quick-facts- (accessed 9 
May 2016). 
 
276
  SADC Secretariat ‘Council Approves SADC Business Plan and Budget for 2014/15’  2 April 2014 available at: 
https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/council-approves-sadc-business-plan-and-budget-201415/ (accessed 9 May 
2016). 
 
277
 SADC Secretariat ‘Council Approves SADC Business Plan and Budget for 2014/15’  2 April 2014 available at: 
https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/council-approves-sadc-business-plan-and-budget-201415/ (accessed 9 May 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 64  
 
indirectly, and those by donor partners. Suffice it to also mention that the donor partners or 
development partners will most likely have a big role to play in the implementation of the TFTA. 
For instance, the World Bank has already made a commitment towards helping to mobilise the 
necessary resources for the effective implementation of the TFTA development programmes.
278
 
 
The payment of the REC membership fee or contribution is already burdensome on the taxpayers 
of some member states.
279
 Similarly, multiplicity of REC memberships may be a burden on the 
institutional capacities and resources of many a country.
280
 It can therefore be argued that 
membership fees and participation in the activities of the TFTA institutions, for instance, 
attending TFTA meetings, will be very costly for countries with multiple REC memberships. 
Such financial contributions towards the functioning of the TFTA institutions and the 
operationalisation of the TFTA will add to the financial problems that countries with multiple 
REC memberships already face in their RECs. In the long run, such financial problems may 
cause inadequate and unpredictable funding for TFTA institutions and this may affect the proper 
functioning of the TFTA.  
 
In this vein, Mwanza summed up the challenges that emanate from African regional integration 
initiatives, especially those that rely heavily on membership contributions: 
 
‘.....the REC’s success at deep regional integration is limited by inadequate 
capabilities, insufficient and unpredictable funding, poor remuneration for staff 
members and weak capacity. Funding problems emanate from the lack of increase 
in funding in line with the expanded mandate of RECs, the delays in payment of 
assessed contributions by member states...and their increased financial obligations 
due to multiple memberships of RECs which has resulted in weak staffing at REC 
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secretariats and consequence lack of programmatic visibility. Secretariats are not 
able to implement proactive activities such as monitoring the state of 
implementation by member countries.’281 
 
In the above passage, the author highlights that funding for RECs emanating from member states 
is most often insufficient and unpredictable. He considered the increase in financial obligations 
caused by multiple REC memberships to be one of the reasons for the insufficient and 
unpredictable funding. This, in the end, affects the functioning of not only the secretariat and 
other institutions of the REC, but also the overall performance of the REC.  
 
Similarly, in the case of the TFTA, this mini thesis submits that the increased financial 
obligations as a result of the establishment of the TFTA institutions may worsen the already 
weak financial positions of most African countries, especially those with multiple REC 
memberships. Most of the African countries that have multiple REC memberships are already 
experiencing severe macro-economic disequilibrium, financial debt service burdens, over-valued 
currencies, high inflation rates, high taxes, huge budget deficits, lack of trade finance, and a 
narrow tax base that heavily relies on customs duties as a source of revenue.
282
 As a result of 
these economic challenges, these countries already have very little funds available in their 
budgets to fund their domestic needs. Therefore, additional contributions towards the functioning 
of TFTA institutions will significantly constrain their budgets.  
 
Cases of countries finding it difficult to honour their financial obligations as a result of multiple 
REC memberships have been already noted. It was discussed earlier in this mini thesis that 
Tanzania withdrew its membership of COMESA, citing difficulties in meeting its financial 
obligations to two RECs.
283
  Tanzania is a member of both the EAC and SADC. If Tanzania 
ratifies the TFTA Agreement that will mean Tanzania will be expected to meet its financial 
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obligations not only under the TFTA Agreement but also under both the EAC and SADC 
treaties. The financial costs of maintaining memberships in the three regional groupings may 
negatively impact on the annual budget of Tanzania. 
 
Furthermore, it has also been reported that some RECs in the TFTA do face economic challenges 
because members’ contributions have not been forthcoming or have been inconsistent.284 For 
instance in SADC, the equal contributions from member states have, reportedly, been 
inconsistent.
285
 In some cases, this has forced SADC to impose sanctions on defaulting members 
in order to enforce compliance. An example of one of the countries with multiple REC 
memberships that was subjected to sanctions as a result of non-payment of membership fees is 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
286
 The DRC is currently a member of COMESA and 
SADC.
287
 It was reported that in 2007, at a SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in 
Zambia, DRC was suspended from taking part in any SADC activities for owing SADC US$ 
1,369, 190 in annual contributions.
288
  It should also be noted that outside the TFTA, DRC is also 
a member of another REC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). If the 
DRC ratifies the TFTA Agreement, it will be expected to meet its financial obligations in four 
regional economic groupings: TFTA, COMESA, ECCAS and SADC. Just like Tanzania, the 
financial costs towards these regional groupings may negatively impact on the DRC’s annual 
budget. However, the budgets of countries with single REC memberships may not be greatly 
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affected by TFTA contributions when compared with those with multiple REC memberships, as 
the magnitude of the financial costs may be small. 
 
In addition, the overburdened REC secretariats which are already under-funded and over-
stretched will have to cope with the increased mandate of servicing the TFTA through the 
Tripartite Task Force. Financially this will imply that there will be a need for additional funds in 
the REC secretariats’ budgets so that they are enabled to undertake and discharge their 
corresponding TFTA duties and responsibilities.  
 
For instance, it was reported that, in 2010, the administrative costs of the operations of the three 
RECs were as follows: (a) COMESA Secretariat: US$ 6 million; (b) EAC Secretariat: US$ 2 
million; and (c) SADC Secretariat: US$ 9 million.
289
 Assuming that all factors remain constant, 
with the addition of Tripartite Task Force responsibilities under the TFTA, the administrative 
costs for running the three secretariats may also rise. This is so because secretariat staff will also 
be required to fulfil their fresh responsibilities under the Tripartite Task Force. This will put a 
big strain on the budgets of the cash strapped secretariats. As a consequence, the RECs member 
states’ contributions may require an increase in order to cater for the expanded mandates of the 
secretariats, otherwise the integration agenda in the RECs will be negatively affected. Member 
states will, hence, be required to dig deep into their coffers.  In the end, it will also be the 
countries with multiple REC memberships that will be hit hardest, as they will be expected to 
increase their membership contributions to two or more RECs. 
 
This mini thesis therefore submits that due to the increased direct and indirect financial costs of 
the functioning of the TFTA institutions, the countries with multiple REC memberships will be 
hit hardest. The multiplication of the financial obligations of countries with multiple REC 
memberships will make it hard for them to honour these obligations and may, in the long run, 
affect the proper functioning of the TFTA.  
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4.2.2. Increased human resource cost 
 
The TFTA institutions may also have a negative impact on not only financial resources of 
countries with multiple REC memberships, as discussed above, but may also overstretch the 
human resources responsible for regional integration issues in these countries.
290
 It was observed 
in the s. 3.4 of this mini thesis that the TFTA institutions may not be very different from those 
institutions that are in existence in the three RECs. The composition and functions of these sets 
of institutions are mostly indistinguishable. As a result, there is a possibility that the same 
government personnel or officials from a Tripartite member/partner state may attend both TFTA 
institutions’ and RECs’ meetings. Since the composition and functions of the institutions in these 
two regimes are similar, there is a great possibility of one government official attending more 
than two meetings, per year, on matters that are roughly similar. This may be costly for member 
states, as it will put a strain on the few and weary government officials attending such multiple 
meetings. Similarly, it will also be the countries with multiple REC memberships that will be 
affected the most, as the number of meetings may, in some cases, may be tripled. 
 
On the issue of escalation of human resource costs, an Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) study 
did find that countries with multiple REC memberships face problems participating in COMESA 
and SADC meetings, because of the human and financial costs associated with membership.
291
  
Similarly, it is can be argued that the addition of similar institutions under the TFTA will mean 
that the same government officials from countries that already faced challenges attending 
COMESA and SADC meetings, will have to attend additional meetings under the TFTA.  
 
The TFTA Agreement is silent on the frequency of meetings for its institutions. So far, the TFTA 
arrangement has only held three Heads of State and Government Summits, in 2008, 2011 and 
2015. It was reported that the next Tripartite Summit meeting will be hosted by Rwanda.
292
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TFTA meetings may have probably been held at such long intervals because of the protracted 
negotiations regarding issues during the TFTA teething stages. However, it is likely that during 
the TFTA implementation stages, the intervals between TFTA meetings may be short. Therefore, 
shorter intervals between meetings will imply greater transactional costs for government officials 
in countries with multiple REC memberships as it may mean attending many regional meetings 
within a short space of time. 
 
An example of a country with multiple REC memberships in the TFTA is Malawi.
293
 Malawi is 
currently a member of both COMESA and SADC. By virtue of his office, the President of the 
Republic of Malawi is a member of both the Authority of COMESA and the Summit of SADC. 
In the event that Malawi ratifies the TFTA Agreement, then the Malawian President will also 
become a member of the TFTA Summit. Currently, Art.8 (5) of the COMESA Treaty requires 
the President of Malawi to attend at least one ordinary Summit of the Authority and any other 
extra-ordinary Summit, per year. Similarly, in SADC, under Art.10 (5) of the SADC Treaty, the 
same President is required to attend two ordinary Summits and any other extraordinary summits, 
per year. In SADC, the meetings for the President of Malawi may be more than two, if Malawi is 
serving as a member of the SADC Troika. This is because SADC Troika meetings are held more 
frequently as compared with Summits.
294
 Therefore, under normal circumstances, in the absence 
of Authority or Summit extraordinary meetings or SADC Troika meetings, the President of 
Malawi is expected to attend a minimum of three REC meetings per year. These meetings 
exclude the other bilateral, regional or multilateral meetings which the same President is 
expected to attend annually, for instance, the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government or 
the UN General Assembly meeting.
295
 Now, with the establishment of the TFTA institutions, the 
Malawian President will also be expected to accommodate the TFTA Summit meetings in his 
already busy schedule. 
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Furthermore, the problems of time demands on key personnel attending regional meetings for 
countries with multiple REC memberships will run through most TFTA institutions, except the 
Tripartite Task Force and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
296
 For instance, in Malawi, the 
Minister responsible for foreign affairs will also be required to attend meetings of the Tripartite 
Council of Ministers, in addition to his usual REC meetings as a member of the COMESA 
Council of Ministers and the SADC Council. Likewise, the Minister responsible for Industry and 
Trade will be expected to attend the meetings of the TFTA Ministers of Trade, as well as the 
SADC Sectoral and Cluster Ministers’ meetings. Similarly, the Minister responsible for Justice 
will be expected to attend the meetings of the TFTA Ministers of Legal Affairs and SADC 
Ministerial cluster meetings. In addition to the Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials’ meeting, 
the Principal Secretary responsible for foreign affairs in Malawi will also be expected to attend 
the COMESA Inter-government Committee meetings and the SADC Standing Committee of 
Officials’ meetings. To have these important public officials out of their offices attending 
regional meetings at the expense of dealing with domestic matters may affect their output in 
executing their domestic mandates. In the long run, this may affect the overall performance of 
the Malawi economy. Similar implications may also exist in economies of other multiple REC 
countries like Tanzania and DRC.
297
  
 
In addition, a study by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) also concluded that the 
attendance at too many regional meetings in Africa leads to poor preparation for the meetings 
and a lack of follow-up by sectoral ministries on decisions that have been taken at a regional 
level.
298
 Equally in the case of the TFTA, this mini thesis argues that the frequency levels of the 
probable TFTA and regional meetings, especially for government officials in countries with 
multiple REC memberships, increases the possibility of such officials attending both TFTA and 
REC meetings poorly prepared. It is also possible that they may fail to adhere to agreed 
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deadlines because the same officials are also required to prepare for another meeting of another 
REC. The multiple REC meetings may make it difficult for these officials to work in their home 
countries and monitor implementation of decisions that have been taken at regional level. This is 
so because the officials may have little time to work in their offices. In the long run, this may 
affect the relevance and effectiveness of their contributions at such regional forums. 
 
Furthermore, there is also a possibility for added tasks for government personnel as they make 
preparations to host frequent regional meetings for both TFTA and REC institutions. It has been 
noted that the next Tripartite Summit will be hosted by Rwanda. This means that Rwandese 
government officials will be expected to collaborate with the Tripartite Task Force in organising 
the logistical arrangements for hosting the TFTA Summit. The planning and hosting of such a 
meeting will entail a lot of material and time sacrifices by the Rwandese government officials.  
In addition, just like it happens in most RECs, the Rwandese government will also be expected to 
organise meetings of both the Tripartite Council of Ministers and the Tripartite Committee of 
Senior Officials, as these two institutions usually set the agenda for the Summit and most often 
precede it.
299
 Rwanda is a member of COMESA and the EAC. Assuming that in the same year 
when the TFTA Summit will be held, Rwanda will also host COMESA or EAC Summits within 
that same period, the capacities of the government officials in Rwanda will be overstretched as 
they prepare and subsequently facilitate many large meetings within a short period of time. 
However, the probability of hosting big regional meetings within a short period of time is slim 
for countries that have a single REC membership. This is because countries with single 
memberships will be involved in the meetings of one REC, beside the TFTA. 
 
On the flip side of the coin, other people may argue that by bringing together officials from all 
the three RECs at to one TFTA meeting may help in reducing the number of regional meetings 
or duplication of meetings. This argument may have correct in the case where the TFTA would 
have succeeded in consolidating the three RECs into one REC. However, as it was noted in s 4.1 
of this mini thesis, the three RECs will still continue to exist separately, advancing their own 
separate regional integration agendas. Given the fact that the TFTA Agreement is silent on 
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frequency of meetings for its institutions, it may not be prudent to assume that duplication of 
regional meetings may be reduced as a result of the establishment of the TFTA. The situation 
may also be complicated by the fact that the TFTA Agreement will only bind those countries that 
have ratified it. Therefore, chances are that there may still be matters that will need to be 
resolved by the TFTA and each REC. Hence, the problem of duplication of regional meetings 
may still exist even with after the establishment of the TFTA. 
 
However, in order to address the problem of duplication of regional meetings, this mini thesis 
will perhaps suggest that the TFTA should explore the possibility of merging some of the 
regional meetings in order to reduce the time spent in such meetings. The TFTA may also adopt 
the principle of subsidiarity between the TFTA and the RECs, so that most matters dealing with 
regional integration are handled at REC level and that the TFTA institutions should only deal 
with matters that cannot be resolved at REC level.
300
 The other option to reduce workload on 
government officials would be to involve the private sector and civil society in the TFTA affairs. 
The TFTA initiative has no institution for private sector and civil society participation, and has 
been criticised as a mere outgrowth of government bureaucracy.
301
 Therefore, having a TFTA 
institution that will involve these groups may reduce both human and financial involvement of 
governments.
302
 
 
It is therefore submitted that the establishment of TFTA institutions may negatively affect the 
human resources of countries with multiple REC memberships. This may not be the case for 
countries that have single REC membership. 
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4.2.3. Increase in non-financial obligations arising from membership to multiple treaties 
 
In addition to the financial and human resource costs discussed above, the TFTA arrangement 
may also increase non-financial obligations for countries that have multiple REC memberships. 
These are obligations in the TFTA Agreement, other than financial obligations, which Tripartite 
member/partner states will be required to comply with. The obligations from the TFTA 
Agreement will be added on similar obligations which these countries already have under their 
respective RECs. Consequently, there will be more obligations on countries that have multiple 
REC memberships, as compared to those countries that do not. The higher the number of REC 
memberships, the more the number of obligations that will need to be complied with. Countries 
with multiple REC memberships will have more obligations to comply with and implement as 
compared with countries with single REC memberships. 
 
Countries with multiple REC memberships also have a high risk of facing obligations from 
RECs that are inconsistent or contradictory. The more the number of obligations from different 
RECs are on one country, the higher the risk of those obligations being inconsistent or 
contradictory. Art.40 of the TFTA Agreement places an obligation on all member/partner states 
to refrain from acts that would defeat the objects and purposes of the TFTA.
303
 Furthermore, Art. 
38 of the TFTA Agreement also provides that any member/partner state that fails to meet its 
obligations under the TFTA Agreement shall be subjected to such sanctions as may be 
determined by the TFTA Summit. Therefore, any country that fails to abide by the obligations 
imposed by the TFTA Agreement will be subjected to sanctions, as will be determined by the 
TFTA Summit. Similar provisions can be found in all the three REC treaties: Art.171 of the 
COMESA Treaty; Art.143 of the EAC Treaty; and Art.33 of the SADC Treaty. Countries with 
multiple REC memberships have a high risk of experiencing inconsistent or contradictory REC 
obligations. 
 
                                            
303
 This principle is a peremptory norm of Public International Law and is found in Art.26 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 74  
 
It has been noted above that the three RECs will operate independently and may not be bound by 
TFTA resolutions.
304
 It has also been observed that the RECs will not be members of the TFTA, 
meaning that the RECs will not be part of the decision making process.
305
 It was further noted 
that under norms of Public International Law, the TFTA arrangements and the RECs will be 
considered to be on a par, meaning that no regime will be superior to the other.
306
 This will imply 
that a decision that has been made by any TFTA institution will only bind the members thereof, 
but will not bind the RECs and the non-TFTA members that are members of a particular REC.   
 
Now suppose that a resolution is made under the TFTA that will bind the TFTA member/partner 
states and another resolution is made in one of the RECs. The REC resolution happens to 
substantially conflicts with the resolution made under the TFTA. In such a case, the TFTA 
member/partner state that is a member of the REC that has made the contrary resolution will be 
held to have violated the TFTA Agreement, if that country decides to comply with the REC 
resolution. Similarly, that TFTA member/partner state may also violate its REC treaty 
obligations, if it elects to comply with the TFTA resolution. This will be a recipe for problems 
for all countries in the TFTA, but the risk of facing such situations will be high in the case of 
countries with multiple REC memberships. This is because of the added probability of more 
obligations from the multiple RECs, which may in some cases be different and conflicting, both 
in substance and procedure. Therefore, the countries with multiple REC memberships will be left 
in a quagmire, as they will have a lot more obligations to consider and implement, compared to 
those with single REC membership. 
 
Another example of a treaty related obligation that should concern countries with multiple REC 
memberships is in Art.36 of the TFTA Agreement. Art.36 (1) of the TFTA Agreement provides 
that TFTA member/partner states shall from time to time conclude such protocols and annexes as 
are necessary for the implementation of the TFTA Agreement. Art.36 (2) further provides that 
such protocols and annexes shall form an integral part of the TFTA Agreement. 
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The procedures for ratification and domestication of international agreements differ from one 
country to another. In many African countries, an international agreement is first, signed; 
secondly, ratified or acceded to; and lastly, domesticated, so that it is applicable as municipal 
law.
307
  The countries that require parliamentary approval before an international agreement is 
enforceable in their country are called dualist system countries.
308
 Monistic system jurisdictions, 
on the other hand, are those where once an international agreement has been ratified there is no 
further requirement for its domestication in order for it to be enforceable by the local courts as 
municipal law.
309
 
 
For countries that will become parties to the TFTA Agreement and follow dualistic system in 
terms of their Constitutions, any protocol that will be concluded under the TFTA will require 
domestication through their respective national parliaments.
310
 The obligation to domesticate the 
TFTA protocols will therefore be an addition to the existing REC obligations to domesticate 
various protocols that are already in force or those that will subsequently be concluded at the 
REC level.  
 
For instance, in SADC, as of 2015, there were a total of 26 protocols in various sectors, such as, 
agriculture, trade, health, wildlife, culture and environment that were in force.
311
 Much as most 
protocols had been ratified, many SADC countries were yet to domesticate most of them. 
Domestication of these protocols is a treaty obligation of all SADC member states that ratify 
these protocols, so that the protocols can be enforceable by the courts in the member state 
concerned.
312
 With the addition of TFTA protocols, SADC member states that will ratify the 
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TFTA Agreement will also bear added obligations of domesticating TFTA protocols, in addition 
to their obligations under the SADC Treaty. Countries with multiple REC memberships will, 
therefore, have even more obligations to domesticate protocols from more than two regional 
regimes. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the TFTA Agreement and its institutions may have negatively affect 
countries with multiple REC memberships as it may entail additional treaty related obligations, 
besides those they already have in their respective RECs. Multiple REC membership countries 
may also be more exposed to the risk of finding themselves under two or more contradictory 
REC obligations. In addition, countries with multiple REC memberships may also have more 
obligations to domesticate both TFTA and multiple REC legal instruments.   
 
 
4.2.4. Difficulties in choice of law and choice of institutions 
 
It was observed in the previous chapter that the nature of the relationship between the TFTA 
institutions and the institutions in the three RECs is not clear. This situation should be a cause for 
concern, especially for countries that have multiple REC memberships, as it may lead to possible 
incidents of forum shopping. Forum shopping may create unnecessary uncertainty and 
unpredictability which may, in the medium to long term, scare away meaningful investment in 
the TFTA.
313
 
 
It has been noted in this mini thesis that the functions and composition of most TFTA institutions 
are similar to institutions in the three RECs. The TFTA institutions and REC institutions may, 
probably, end up exercising similar jurisdiction and powers over the same member/partner states. 
As a result, one country may become a subject to two or more regional institutions that have 
similar functions, powers and composition. For countries that have multiple REC memberships, 
such a situation may create more than one layer of legal regime or forum, with identical 
                                                                                                                                            
 
313
 Stahl M.  ‘Overlapping memberships in COMESA, EAC, SACU & SADC’ Trade policy Options to overcome 
the problem of multiple memberships’ (2005) 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 77  
 
substantial obligations.
314
 These identical layers of regime may possibly create overlaps, conflict 
and competition, in cases where one country belongs to more than one legal regime or forum.
315
 
In addition, legal uncertainty and unpredictability may be created for countries that have multiple 
REC memberships since such a country can apply the TFTA regime or that of any of the relevant 
REC regimes. 
 
The challenge for countries with multiple REC memberships cannot be put any better than in the 
quotation below:  
 
‘Presented with these possible layers of legal regimes and an unclear relationship 
between the two regimes, a problem of overlaps, conflicts and competition of 
jurisdiction may manifest itself. The jurisdiction being referred to is in the sense of 
choice of law and choice of forum....................... This parallel jurisdiction is likely 
to stem from the fact that these will be separate legal systems with identical 
substantive obligations. It is not provided anywhere that the TFTA necessarily 
means the cessation of the RECs. The member states will still have obligations in 
both the RECs and the TFTA. ..........The substantive obligations may collide where 
a member state takes a trade measure that is against the spirit of both [REC] and the 
TFTA as it would stifle implementation of both [the REC Treaty and the TFTA 
Agreement].[Emphasis added]’316  
 
Therefore, in the absence of principles that will govern the choice of institution (forum) or choice 
of applicable law under the TFTA, the member/partner states may be forced to start shopping for 
a favourable forum or law to apply for their case. This is what is commonly referred to as ‘forum 
shopping’. Forum shopping occurs where a matter falls within the jurisdiction of two or more 
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organisations and the parties thereto have a choice of where to take their matter.
317
 Forum 
shopping may have the effect of scaring away potential investment in the countries with multiple 
REC memberships, as investors may not have confidence to invest in such an uncertain and 
unpredictable economy.
318
 
 
Examples of regional institutions that may be exposed to forum shopping are the DSB under the 
TFTA, on the one hand, and the various dispute settlement mechanisms in the three RECs, on the 
other hand. This mini thesis will assume that the DSB, the COMESA Court of Justice, the EAC 
Court of Justice, and the SADC Tribunal will all have parallel jurisdiction. 
 
Gaolaolwe did argue that due to the parallel jurisdiction of the TFTA DSB and REC courts, 
litigants will be left with an option of selecting a forum or court of choice for the settlement of 
their dispute.
319
 She continued to argue that due to lack of guidelines on the exclusivity of the 
jurisdiction of the DSB and the REC courts, it may make it possible for litigants to commence 
the same matter before two or more courts, as the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in 
regional courts.
320
 This mini thesis agrees with Gaolaolwe’s arguments. 
 
The above argument can best be illustrated by a fictitious trade dispute between Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Currently, both Zambia and Zimbabwe are members of COMESA and SADC. 
Assuming that both Zambia and Zimbabwe ratify the TFTA Agreement, in case of occurrence of 
a trade dispute, the two countries will have before them, three possible institutions for the 
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dispute can be initiated in and heard by two or more courts; and (b) the possibility of re-litigating a dispute, where a 
matter that has been settled in one court is re-opened or re-litigated in another court. She adds that this may be costly 
and also affect the development of case law. (See Gaolaolwe D (2013) 74).  
 
320
 Gaolaolwe D (2013) 28.   
‘Res judicata’ is a legal principle that means a matter may not, generally, be re-litigated once it has been judged on 
the merits. (Definition available at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/res_judicata (accessed 16 May 2016)). 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 79  
 
settlement of that dispute.
321
 The countries may choose the COMESA Court of Justice, the 
SADC Tribunal or the TFTA DSB. In the absence of the principle of res judicata, it is possible 
for the countries to pursue the matter in all the three regional dispute settlement mechanisms. If 
the judgments contradict each other, the question now becomes: which judgment will be 
considered as final and enforceable by the parties? Will the country that is not successful in one 
court, accept to be bound by, and therefore comply with, it? The countries with multiple REC 
memberships will therefore encounter challenges on choice of law and choice of institution 
(forum). 
 
Furthermore, according to Luwan, failure to satisfy the res judicata requirement may create a 
further problem for countries with multiple REC memberships, as they may be required to 
enforce two contradictory judgments of regional courts.
322
  Similarly, this thesis agrees with 
Luwan and further argues that in addition to the dilemma of enforcing two contradictory 
judgments, such a precarious situation is not very healthy for the proper development of 
precedent and case law in the TFTA region. Investment can therefore not thrive in such an 
uncertain economic environment, as investors do not have confidence to invest their money in 
it.
323
 As a consequence, countries with multiple REC memberships may experience little flow of 
foreign direct investment. This may affect the regional integration drive not only in the countries 
with multiple REC memberships but also the entire TFTA. 
 
Therefore, there is a need to clarify the relationship between the TFTA and REC institutions. The 
TFTA Agreement and the REC treaties need to be rationalised and amended so that they are 
complementary and not contradictory to each other.
324
  
 
                                            
321
 The assumption being that the matter is provided for under the COMESA Treaty, the SADC Treaty and the 
TFTA Agreement. 
 
322
 Luwan D (2010) 218. 
 
323
 Luwan D (2010) 218. 
 
324
 Hess R & Hess S ‘Regional Integration Arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa-Confusion grows’ 
Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics, Issue No. 43  2 available at: 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k3w8fb9ppr8.pdf?expires=1458903383&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=620BB2DF8A4827FC110FB78625A410E7 (accessed 29 March 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 80  
 
Unless the relationship between the TFTA and REC institutions is rationalised, this mini thesis 
submits that the lack of clarity regarding the choice of law and choice of institution that may 
negatively affect the countries that have multiple REC memberships. 
 
4.2.5.   Little or nominal trade related gains   
 
Lastly, in addition to the above-mentioned repercussions for countries that have multiple REC 
memberships, studies have also indicated that countries with multiple REC memberships may 
experience nominal or little trade related gains after the operationalisation of the TFTA. 
According to a 2011 computer analysis by Jensen and Sandrey, it was shown that under the 
TFTA arrangement there will be fewer trade related gains for TFTA member/partner states that 
have multiple REC memberships.
325
 
 
In their analysis, Jensen and Sandrey examined the trade gains for countries in COMESA, the 
EAC and SADC after the formation of a genuine FTA. They used a computer software model, 
the Global Trade Analysis Project
326
 (GTAP) Version 8 database, to determine the welfare and 
trade gains from the TFTA as determined by the access of duty free merchandise goods and 
services.
327
 In their computer simulation, they assumed that all the three RECs had their free 
trade areas (FTAs) operating in a comprehensive manner and that all the countries in the three 
RECs had ratified the TFTA Agreement and were conducting tariff free trade. The results of 
their simulation were only indicative of what might happen when these three RECs form one 
FTA. The results of their study indicated that for countries with multiple REC memberships, 
there were a limited trade related gains as a result of the formation of the TFTA, whereas 
countries that had single REC memberships, like South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, 
experienced remarkable trade related gains in the TFTA. 
                                            
325
 Jensen G & Sandrey R (2011) 114.  
 
326
The GTAP computer software  is supported by a fully documented, publicly available global database, as well as 
underlying software for data manipulation and for implementing the model. The framework is a system of multi-
sector economy wide input/output tables linked at the sector level through trade flows between commodities used 
both for final consumption and intermediate use in production.  
 
327
 Jensen G & Sandrey R (2011) 114. 
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The probable explanation for the small gains for countries with multiple REC memberships was 
that these countries are already experiencing most of the trade related gains as a result of their 
allegiance to more than one REC.
328
 This mini thesis agrees with the results of the study and 
further submits that the countries with multiple REC memberships will gain little from the TFTA 
since they are already experiencing freer trade with most member/partner states in the TFTA.   
 
In order to hit this point home, this mini thesis will give an example of sugar trade between 
Swaziland and Uganda. Swaziland is a member of COMESA and SADC, whereas Uganda is a 
member of COMESA and the EAC. Assuming that both Swaziland and Uganda become 
member/partner states of the TFTA, there will be little trade gains in regard to sugar exports 
from Swaziland to Uganda because Swaziland already has access to the Ugandan market through 
its COMESA membership. That means for Swaziland, the only gain it may experience under the 
TFTA is sugar trade with the other six EAC partner states, as it already enjoys trade gains by 
trading with most COMESA and SADC countries.
329
 On the other hand, a country with single 
REC membership like Mozambique may experience considerable trade gains as it will benefit 
from accessing markets in more countries that are members of both COMESA and the EAC. 
 
In line with the above analysis, this mini thesis submits that countries with multiple REC 
memberships may experience few trade related gains, when compared to those with single REC 
memberships.  The countries with multiple REC memberships will experience nominal or fewer 
gains from the TFTA Agreement and the institutions it will establish.
330
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
328
 Jensen G & Sandrey R (2011) 114. 
 
329
 It should be noted that currently the trade gains are only enjoyed by those countries that have implemented the 
REC FTAs and not those that are outside them. Swaziland is not participating in the COMESA FTA, as it was 
granted a waiver due to its SACU membership. 
 
330
 Jensen G & Sandrey R (2011) 114. 
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4.3  Conclusion 
 
In sum, this chapter has discussed the probable repercussions for countries with multiple REC 
memberships caused as a result of the establishment of the TFTA institutions. Generally, the 
chapter has discussed the repercussions for countries with multiple REC memberships as a result 
of the operationalisation of the TFTA Agreement.  
 
First, it has demonstrated how the establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement may 
lead to an increase in the financial cost as far as membership costs are concerned for countries 
with multiple REC memberships. The increased cost may arise due to direct and indirect costs of 
multiple memberships to both the TFTA and the respective RECs.  There is also the probability 
of increased cost due to the raising of REC membership fees, as the RECs’ secretariats may 
require extra funds so that they are able to serve in the Tripartite Task Force. 
 
Secondly, it has also been argued that the establishment of TFTA institutions may also translate 
into increased human resource costs in respect of certain officials in the government 
bureaucracies for countries with multiple REC memberships. It was demonstrated how the TFTA 
institutions and the RECs institutions are similar as far as composition and functions are 
concerned. Therefore, this mini thesis has argued that since it will be these same government 
officials attending both TFTA and RECs meetings there may be over-extension of the working 
capacities of the officials in countries that have multiple REC memberships, as they may be 
required to attend more than two regional meetings over a very short period of time.   
 
Furthermore, it was also discussed that there is a likelihood of hosting two or more large regional 
meetings within a short period of time for countries with multiple REC memberships. It has also 
been argued that such a strain on the human resource of a country may, in the long run, affect 
their productivity in addressing domestic matters. In addition, it was submitted that the short time 
between meetings may also result in the government officials being poorly prepared when 
attending regional meetings. 
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Thirdly, it was demonstrated how the TFTA Agreement may triple non financial obligations that 
emanate from treaty memberships for countries with multiple REC memberships. Multiple REC 
membership countries may also be more exposed to the risk of finding themselves under two or 
more contradictory REC obligations. In addition, countries with multiple REC memberships may 
also have more obligations to domesticate both TFTA and multiple REC legal instruments.  
 
Fourthly, it was also shown how the lack of clarity in the relationship between the TFTA 
institutions and the RECs’ institutions may negatively impact on countries that have multiple 
REC memberships.  It was discussed that the relationship between these two regimes is not clear 
and therefore member states may be left to choose which regime should be utilised when 
conducting trade between them. This uncertainty and unpredictability is a recipe for forum 
shopping. In the long run, this uncertainty may scare away potential investors. 
 
Lastly, it was demonstrated that there is a possibility that countries with multiple REC 
memberships may reap a few trade related gains as compared to those countries that have single 
REC memberships. This is so because of the gains that countries with multiple REC 
memberships are already enjoying by virtue of the multiplicity of their memberships.   
 
Having discussed the various repercussions of the establishment of the TFTA institutions on 
countries that have multiple REC memberships, the next chapter will discuss the conclusions that 
can be drawn from this mini thesis. In addition to drawing the conclusion, the next chapter will 
also make a few recommendations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Conclusions 
 
The aim of this mini thesis was to examine the repercussions of the establishment of institutions 
under the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) Agreement on countries that have multiple regional 
economic community (REC) memberships. It has been noted that even though the TFTA 
initiative is being considered as a milestone towards the ultimate establishment of the African 
economic Community (AEC) and that it will help solve problems associated with multiple REC 
memberships, the initiative may come at a cost to countries that have multiple REC 
memberships. This mini thesis has found that the establishment of TFTA institutions may be 
costly for those Tripartite member/partner states that will maintain multiple REC memberships.  
 
First, chapter two of this mini thesis has demonstrated the extent of multiplicity of REC 
memberships in the TFTA.
331
 The chapter noted that all the three RECs contain countries that 
have maintained memberships in more than one REC.
332
  The chapter further demonstrated how 
the three RECs have established similar regional integration institutions (RIIs).
333
 A couple of 
institutions were also noted to be common in all the three RECs. Most of these institutions have 
been replicated under the TFTA Agreement. 
Secondly, chapter three of this mini thesis not only discussed the salient provisions of the TFTA 
Agreement, but also examined the institutions that will be established by the TFTA Agreement 
and the functions which they will be expected to perform.
334
 The chapter further demonstrated 
                                            
331
 See s.  2.5 of this mini thesis. 
 
332
 See ss. 2.2.2., 2.3.2., 2.4.2. & 2.5. 
 
333
See ss. 2.2.3, 2.3.3., 2.4.3 & 2.5. 
 
334
 See ss. 3.3 & 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
Page | 85  
 
how the TFTA institutions replicate the institutions that already exist in the three RECs, in terms 
of both composition and functions.
335
 
 
Chapter three of the mini thesis further discussed the probable relationship that may exist 
between, on the one hand, the TFTA institutions and, on the other hand, the RECs’ 
institutions.
336
 It was noted in the discussion that the TFTA Agreement is silent on how the 
TFTA institutions will interact with the RECs’ institutions. Furthermore, there are no guidelines 
on the interface between TFTA institutions and REC institutions. This lack of clarity about the 
relationship therefore leaves a lot of room for forum shopping by member states. Incidents of 
forum shopping may scare away potential investors from the TFTA.
337
   
 
In addition, chapter four of the mini thesis also established that since the TFTA will not dissolve 
and merge the three RECs into one, single regime, but only rationalises and consolidates them 
into a single FTA, multiple and overlapping REC memberships will continue to exist, even after 
the establishment of the TFTA.
338
 It further demonstrated how, despite the fact that the TFTA 
initiative will not establish a new REC, the obligations of member/partner states under the TFTA 
Agreement may not be much different from the obligations that the same member/partner states 
already have under their respective RECs.
339
 
 
The mini thesis has concluded that the establishment of TFTA institutions may have the 
following repercussions on countries that have multiple REC memberships: 
 
First, it has argued that the establishment of institutions under the TFTA Agreement may result 
in an increase in the financial cost, as far as membership costs are concerned for countries with 
                                            
335
 See s. 3.4. 
 
336
 See s. 3.5. 
 
337
 See s. 3.5 & 3.6. 
 
338
 See s. 4.1. 
 
339
 See s 4.1. 
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multiple REC memberships.
340
 The increased cost may come as a result of direct and indirect 
costs associated with multiple memberships to both the TFTA and the respective RECs.  In 
addition, there may also be an extra cost as far as REC membership fees are concerned, as the 
RECs’ secretariats may require more funds in order to be able to serve in the Tripartite Task 
Force. 
 
Secondly, it has argued that the establishment of the TFTA institutions may also translate into 
increased human resource costs for officials in the government bureaucracies in the countries 
with multiple REC memberships.
341
 The mini thesis demonstrated how some TFTA and REC 
institutions are similar in their composition and functions. It further argued that since it will be 
the same government officials attending both TFTA and RECs meetings there may be too great a 
workload for these officials.  Furthermore, it has also been argued that for countries with 
multiple REC memberships, there may be a possible risk of hosting two or more big regional 
meetings within a short period of time. Apart from financial costs, regional meetings require 
investment of time and effort on the part of personnel from the hosting country. It has therefore 
been argued that putting a strain on government human resources of a country may, in the long 
run, affect their productivity in addressing their domestic matters. In addition, it was also argued 
that the short period of time between regional meetings may also result in government officials 
being poorly prepared when attending the meetings, and that this may affect the quality of their 
contributions. 
 
Thirdly, the mini thesis has also argued that the TFTA Agreement may increase non financial 
treaty related obligations for countries with multiple REC memberships.
342
 Multiple REC 
membership countries may also be more exposed to the risk of finding themselves under two or 
more contradictory REC obligations. In addition, countries with multiple REC memberships may 
also have more obligations to domesticate both TFTA and multiple REC legal instruments. 
 
                                            
340
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341
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342
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Fourthly, the mini thesis has further demonstrated how the lack of clarity in the relationship 
between the TFTA institutions and the RECs’ institutions may negatively impact on countries 
that have multiple REC memberships.
343
  It has argued that since the relationship between the 
TFTA and RECs regimes is not clear, Tripartite member/partner states may be left to choose 
between two or more different regimes, creating uncertainty and unpredictability. This 
uncertainty and unpredictability may lead to forum shopping, a situation which may in the long 
run scare away potential investors. 
 
Lastly, the mini thesis has argued that there is also a possibility that countries with multiple REC 
memberships may reap fewer trade related gains than those countries that have single REC 
memberships.
344
 This is so because of the gains that these countries are already enjoying by 
virtue of the multiplicity of their memberships. 
 
In sum, the mini thesis has argued that even as the establishment of the TFTA initiative is an 
important milestone for Africa, it may also bring about the above-mentioned repercussions for 
countries with multiple REC memberships. It is therefore against this backdrop that this mini 
thesis would like to make a few recommendations. 
 
5.2   Recommendations 
 
 5.2.1. Identification of sustainable resource mobilisation mechanism 
 
Having noted that the countries with multiple REC memberships may encounter increased 
financial costs, this mini thesis recommends that the TFTA initiative should establish a 
sustainable mechanism for resource mobilisation. This mechanism may help reduce the financial 
burden on member/partner states to finance the operations of the TFTA institutions and the 
implementation of TFTA programs. For instance, the TFTA may establish a sustainable trust 
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fund, managed by the Tripartite Task Force.
345
  A sustainable initiative, like a trust fund, may go 
a long way in easing the financial burden on countries with multiple REC memberships, while 
also ensuring the sustainability of the TFTA institutions and their operations. 
 
 5.2.2. Private sector and civil society involvement and investment 
 
This mini thesis also recommends the involvement and investment of the private sector and civil 
society in TFTA activities. This mini thesis has noted that Art. 29 of the TFTA Agreement only 
establishes inter-government institutions and there is no or little private sector or civil society 
participation in the TFTA. The TFTA initiative has thus been criticised as being a mere 
outgrowth of governmental bureaucracy.
346
 The private sector and the civil society may have the 
capacity to provide both human and financial resources towards the TFTA activities.
347
 
Therefore, involving, and investing in, the private sector and civil society may help reduce the 
burden on both government officials and state funds.  
 
5.2.3. Adoption of principles that will govern choice of law and choice of forum in the 
Tripartite area 
 
This mini thesis further recommends that the TFTA Agreement should be amended in order to 
clarify the nature of the relationship between the TFTA institutions and the existing REC 
institutions.
348
 In addition, the TFTA Agreement must provide for principles that will govern the 
choice of law and choice of forum between the TFTA and REC regimes.
349
 There is a need for 
clear demarcation lines and rules for the TFTA and the RECs. This clarity may help avoid the 
problem of forum shopping by member/partner states. 
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 5.2.4. Rationalising and amending the RECs’ treaties 
 
This mini thesis also recommends that the treaties establishing the three RECs need to be 
rationalised and amended so that they support the TFTA Agreement and not contradict it.
350
 The 
mini thesis further recommends the harmonisation and co-ordination of TFTA and REC policies 
and programmes in order to avoid duplication of effort and wasting of resources.
351
 To this end, 
the mini thesis suggests the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity between the TFTA and the 
RECs.
352
  Under the principle of subsidiarity, the RECs may deal with most matters regarding 
integration in the region, and leave the TFTA to only deal with those matters that cannot be dealt 
with at REC level. Doing so will not only avoid duplication and the overloading of TFTA 
institutions with things that can be done at REC level, but will also reduce the frequency of 
TFTA meetings. This may help reduce the financial and human resource costs for countries, 
especially those with multiple REC memberships. 
 
 5.2.5. Strengthening of the existing RECs’ institutions  
 
Lastly, this mini thesis recommends the need to strengthen the existing REC institutions, as is 
required under the first stage of the AEC Treaty.
353
 Recently there has been an over-
concentration on the establishment of new regional institutions rather than strengthening the 
already existing ones because this may weaken the existing institutions or undermine their 
effectiveness and relevance.
354
 Strengthening the REC institutions and financial markets may be 
vital as it may help mobilise financial and human resources needed to finance and carry out new 
integration projects.
355
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It is appropriate to end with a quotation from the then Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Secretary General, who in his 2000 Jubilee Interim Report, berated the 
pattern of establishing new RIIs, in these words: 
 
‘Instead of asking with whom, in what context and under what conditions 
integration might be possible, attention has been on the institutions to be 
established and the measures to be promoted. Giving priority to identifying 
institutional arrangements completely diverts attention from the vital task of 
determining socio-economic objectives and setting priorities.’356 
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